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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0248: yty

yty is a modular, plugin-based malware framework. The components of the framework are written in a variety of programming languages. [1]

EnterpriseS0248MalwareObject v1.3Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0248: yty describes [yty](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0248) is a modular, plugin-based malware framework. The components of the framework are written in a variety of programming languages. (Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018)

Executive priority

S0248: yty is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0248: yty by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0248: yty appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

yty

yty is a modular, plugin-based malware framework. The components of the framework are written in a variety of programming languages. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

15 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1680Local Storage Discovery

yty gathers the the serial number of the main disk volume.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

yty gathers information on victim’s drives and has a plugin for document listing.[1]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

yty establishes persistence by creating a scheduled task with the command SchTasks /Create /SC DAILY /TN BigData /TR “ + path_file + “/ST 09:30“.[1]

EnterpriseT1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationSub-technique

yty communicates to the C2 server by retrieving a Google Doc.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.016Junk Code InsertionSub-technique

yty contains junk code in its binary, likely to confuse malware analysts.[1]

EnterpriseT1018Remote System Discovery

yty uses the net view command for discovery.[1]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

yty collects files with the following extensions: .ppt, .pptx, .pdf, .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .docm, .rtf, .inp, .xlsm, .csv, .odt, .pps, .vcf and sends them back to the C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1497.001System ChecksSub-technique

yty has some basic anti-sandbox detection that tries to detect Virtual PC, Sandboxie, and VMware. [1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

yty gets an output of running processes using the tasklist command.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

yty collects the victim’s username.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

yty gathers the computer name, CPU information, Microsoft Windows version, and runs the command systeminfo.[1]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

yty uses a keylogger plugin to gather keystrokes.[1]

EnterpriseT1113Screen Capture

yty collects screenshots of the victim machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

yty packs a plugin with UPX.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

yty runs ipconfig /all and collects the domain name.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1680: Local Storage DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1102.002: Bidirectional CommunicationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.016: Junk Code InsertionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1018: Remote System DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1497.001: System ChecksEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1056.001: KeyloggingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1113: Screen CaptureEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.002: Software PackingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.3
Created
Modified
Raw hash
f59d8d98d4d07391...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.3Current bundlef59d8d98d4d0…
19.21.3Older bundlef59d8d98d4d0…
19.11.3Older bundlef59d8d98d4d0…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    ASERT Donot March 2018

    Schwarz, D., Sopko J. (2018, March 08). Donot Team Leverages New Modular Malware Framework in South Asia. Retrieved June 11, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS0248
    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    yty

    (Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018)

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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