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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0070: HTTPBrowser

HTTPBrowser is malware that has been used by several threat groups. [1] [2] It is believed to be of Chinese origin. [3]

EnterpriseS0070MalwareObject v1.1Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0070: HTTPBrowser describes [HTTPBrowser](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0070) is malware that has been used by several threat groups. (Citation: ThreatStream Evasion Analysis) (Citation: Dell TG-3390) It is believed to be of Chinese origin. (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem)

Executive priority

S0070: HTTPBrowser is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0070: HTTPBrowser by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0070: HTTPBrowser appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

HTTPBrowser

HTTPBrowser is malware that has been used by several threat groups. [1] [2] It is believed to be of Chinese origin. [3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

11 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

HTTPBrowser is capable of writing a file to the compromised system from the C2 server.[2]

EnterpriseT1574.001DLLSub-technique

HTTPBrowser abuses the Windows DLL load order by using a legitimate Symantec anti-virus binary, VPDN_LU.exe, to load a malicious DLL that mimics a legitimate Symantec DLL, navlu.dll.CitationZScaler Hacking Team HTTPBrowser has also used DLL side-loading.[2]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

HTTPBrowser has established persistence by setting the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key value for wdm to the path of the executable. It has also used the Registry entry HKEY_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run vpdn “%ALLUSERPROFILE%\%APPDATA%\vpdn\VPDN_LU.exe” to establish persistence.CitationZScaler Hacking Team[1]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

HTTPBrowser's code may be obfuscated through structured exception handling and return-oriented programming.[2]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

HTTPBrowser is capable of spawning a reverse shell on a victim.[2]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

HTTPBrowser's installer contains a malicious file named navlu.dll to decrypt and run the RAT. navlu.dll is also the name of a legitimate Symantec DLL.CitationZScaler Hacking Team

EnterpriseT1071.004DNSSub-technique

HTTPBrowser has used DNS for command and control.[2][1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

HTTPBrowser is capable of listing files, folders, and drives on a victim.[2]CitationZScaler Hacking Team

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

HTTPBrowser is capable of capturing keystrokes on victims.[2]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

HTTPBrowser has used HTTP and HTTPS for command and control.[2][1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

HTTPBrowser deletes its original installer file once installation is complete.CitationZScaler Hacking Team

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0027: Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.[1] The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, manufacturing and gambling/betting sectors.[2][3][4]

GroupEnterprise

G0026: APT18

APT18 is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has targeted a range of industries, including technology, manufacturing, human rights groups, government, and medical. [1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
4e212c6116aef3e0...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.1Current bundle4e212c6116ae…
19.21.1Older bundle4e212c6116ae…
19.11.1Older bundle4e212c6116ae…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    ThreatStream Evasion Analysis

    Shelmire, A.. (2015, July 6). Evasive Maneuvers. Retrieved January 22, 2016.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Dell TG-3390

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    ThreatConnect Anthem

    ThreatConnect Research Team. (2015, February 27). The Anthem Hack: All Roads Lead to China. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    HttpDump

    (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem)

  5. [5]
    mitre-attackS0070
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.