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MITRE ATT&CK® Mitigation

M0945: Code Signing

Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.

ICSM0945MitigationObject v1.1Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

M0945: Code Signing describes Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.

Executive priority

M0945: Code Signing is an official MITRE ATT&CK mitigation. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate M0945: Code Signing by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether M0945: Code Signing appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Code Signing

Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

15 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
ICST0873.001Siemens Project File FormatSub-technique

Allow for code signing of any project files stored at rest to prevent unauthorized tampering. Ensure the signing keys are not easily accessible on the same system.

ICST0843.001Download AllSub-technique

Utilize code signatures to verify the integrity and authenticity of programs downloaded to the device.

ICST0851Rootkit

Digital signatures may be used to ensure application DLLs are authentic prior to execution.

ICST1693Modify Firmware

Devices should verify that firmware has been properly signed by the vendor before allowing installation.

ICST0821Modify Controller Tasking

Utilize code signatures to verify the integrity and authenticity of programs installed on safety or control assets, including the associated controller tasking.

ICST1693.002Module FirmwareSub-technique

Devices should verify that firmware has been properly signed by the vendor before allowing installation.

ICST0889Modify Program

Utilize code signatures to verify the integrity and authenticity of programs installed on safety or control assets.

ICST0849Masquerading

Require signed binaries.

ICST0843.003Program AppendSub-technique

Utilize code signatures to verify the integrity and authenticity of programs downloaded to the device.

ICST0843Program Download

Utilize code signatures to verify the integrity and authenticity of programs downloaded to the device.

ICST0862Supply Chain Compromise

When available utilize hardware and software root-of-trust to verify the authenticity of a system. This may be achieved through cryptographic means, such as digital signatures or hashes, of critical software and firmware throughout the supply chain.

ICST0843.002Online EditSub-technique

Utilize code signatures to verify the integrity and authenticity of programs downloaded to the device.

ICST0863User Execution

Prevent the use of unsigned executables, such as installers and scripts.

ICST1693.001System FirmwareSub-technique

Devices should verify that firmware has been properly signed by the vendor before allowing installation.

ICST0873Project File Infection

Allow for code signing of any project files stored at rest to prevent unauthorized tampering. Ensure the signing keys are not easily accessible on the same system.

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

mitigates · TechniqueT0873.001: Siemens Project File FormatICSmitigates · TechniqueT0843.001: Download AllICSmitigates · TechniqueT0851: RootkitICSmitigates · TechniqueT1693: Modify FirmwareICSmitigates · TechniqueT0821: Modify Controller TaskingICSmitigates · TechniqueT1693.002: Module FirmwareICSmitigates · TechniqueT0889: Modify ProgramICSmitigates · TechniqueT0849: MasqueradingICSmitigates · TechniqueT0843.003: Program AppendICSmitigates · TechniqueT0843: Program DownloadICSmitigates · TechniqueT0862: Supply Chain CompromiseICSmitigates · TechniqueT0843.002: Online EditICSmitigates · TechniqueT0863: User ExecutionICSmitigates · TechniqueT1693.001: System FirmwareICSmitigates · TechniqueT0873: Project File InfectionICS
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
509ca92edd4aaa2d...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundle509ca92edd4a…
19.11.1Older bundle509ca92edd4a…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    mitre-attackM0945
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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