G0130: Ajax Security Team
Ajax Security Team is a group that has been active since at least 2010 and believed to be operating out of Iran. By 2014 Ajax Security Team transitioned from website defacement operations to malware-based cyber espionage campaigns targeting the US defense industrial base and Iranian users of anti-censorship technologies.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
G0130: Ajax Security Team describes [Ajax Security Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0130) is a group that has been active since at least 2010 and believed to be operating out of Iran. By 2014 [Ajax Security Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0130) transitioned from website defacement operations to malware-based cyber espionage campaigns targeting the US defense industrial base and Iranian users of anti-censorship technologies.(Citation: FireEye Operation Saffron Rose 2013)
Executive priority
G0130: Ajax Security Team is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G0130: Ajax Security Team by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G0130: Ajax Security Team appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Ajax Security Team
Ajax Security Team is a group that has been active since at least 2010 and believed to be operating out of Iran. By 2014 Ajax Security Team transitioned from website defacement operations to malware-based cyber espionage campaigns targeting the US defense industrial base and Iranian users of anti-censorship technologies.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1056.001 | KeyloggingSub-technique | Ajax Security Team has used CWoolger and MPK, custom-developed malware, which recorded all keystrokes on an infected system.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1566.003 | Spearphishing via ServiceSub-technique | Ajax Security Team has used various social media channels to spearphish victims.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1566.001 | Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique | Ajax Security Team has used personalized spearphishing attachments.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | Ajax Security Team has lured victims into executing malicious files.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1555.003 | Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique | Ajax Security Team has used FireMalv custom-developed malware, which collected passwords from the Firefox browser storage.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Ajax Security Team has used Wrapper/Gholee, custom-developed malware, which downloaded additional malware to the infected system.[2] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0225: sqlmap
S0224: Havij
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 7247db005249… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 33e1685a737a… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]FireEye Operation Saffron Rose 2013
Villeneuve, N. et al.. (2013). OPERATION SAFFRON ROSE . Retrieved May 28, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]Check Point Rocket Kitten
Check Point Software Technologies. (2015). ROCKET KITTEN: A CAMPAIGN WITH 9 LIVES. Retrieved March 16, 2018.
Open source URL - [3]AjaxTM
(Citation: FireEye Operation Saffron Rose 2013)
- [4]CrowdStrike Flying Kitten
Dahl, M.. (2014, May 13). Cat Scratch Fever: CrowdStrike Tracks Newly Reported Iranian Actor as FLYING KITTEN. Retrieved May 27, 2020.
Open source URL - [5]Flying Kitten
(Citation: CrowdStrike Flying Kitten )
- [6]IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017
Iran Threats . (2017, December 5). Flying Kitten to Rocket Kitten, A Case of Ambiguity and Shared Code. Retrieved May 28, 2020.
Open source URL - [7]Operation Saffron Rose
(Citation: FireEye Operation Saffron Rose 2013)
- [8]Operation Woolen-Goldfish
Analysis of infrastructure, tools, and modes of operation revealed a potential relationship between [Ajax Security Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0130) and the campaign Operation Woolen-Goldfish.(Citation: Check Point Rocket Kitten)(Citation: TrendMicro Operation Woolen Goldfish March 2015)
- [9]Rocket Kitten
Analysis of infrastructure, tools, and modes of operation revealed a potential relationship between [Ajax Security Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0130) and Rocket Kitten.(Citation: Check Point Rocket Kitten)(Citation: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017)
- [10]TrendMicro Operation Woolen Goldfish March 2015
Cedric Pernet, Kenney Lu. (2015, March 19). Operation Woolen-Goldfish - When Kittens Go phishing. Retrieved April 21, 2021.
Open source URL - [11]mitre-attackG0130Open source URL
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