G0105: DarkVishnya
DarkVishnya is a financially motivated threat actor targeting financial institutions in Eastern Europe. In 2017-2018 the group attacked at least 8 banks in this region.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
G0105: DarkVishnya describes [DarkVishnya](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0105) is a financially motivated threat actor targeting financial institutions in Eastern Europe. In 2017-2018 the group attacked at least 8 banks in this region.(Citation: Securelist DarkVishnya Dec 2018)
Executive priority
G0105: DarkVishnya is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G0105: DarkVishnya by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G0105: DarkVishnya appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
DarkVishnya
DarkVishnya is a financially motivated threat actor targeting financial institutions in Eastern Europe. In 2017-2018 the group attacked at least 8 banks in this region.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1200 | Hardware Additions | DarkVishnya physically connected Bash Bunny, Raspberry Pi, netbooks, and inexpensive laptops to the target organization's environment to access the company’s local network.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1588.002 | ToolSub-technique | DarkVishnya has obtained and used tools such as Impacket, Winexe, and PsExec.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1543.003 | Windows ServiceSub-technique | DarkVishnya created new services for shellcode loaders distribution.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1046 | Network Service Discovery | DarkVishnya performed port scanning to obtain the list of active services.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1135 | Network Share Discovery | DarkVishnya scanned the network for public shared folders.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1110 | Brute Force | DarkVishnya used brute-force attack to obtain login data.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1219 | Remote Access Tools | DarkVishnya used DameWare Mini Remote Control for lateral movement.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | DarkVishnya used PowerShell to create shellcode loaders.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1040 | Network Sniffing | DarkVishnya used network sniffing to obtain login data. [1] |
| Enterprise | T1571 | Non-Standard Port | DarkVishnya used ports 5190 and 7900 for shellcode listeners, and 4444, 4445, 31337 for shellcode C2.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0191: Winexe
S0029: PsExec
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 4341eb4df194… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | fa1ca8f2ba08… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Securelist DarkVishnya Dec 2018
Golovanov, S. (2018, December 6). DarkVishnya: Banks attacked through direct connection to local network. Retrieved May 15, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]DarkVishnya
(Citation: Securelist DarkVishnya Dec 2018)
- [3]mitre-attackG0105Open source URL
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