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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1624.001: Broadcast Receivers

Adversaries may establish persistence using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Mobile operating systems have means to subscribe to events such as receiving an SMS message, device boot completion, or other device activities.

An intent is a message passed between Android applications or system components. Applications can register to receive broadcast intents at runtime, which are system-wide intents delivered to each app when certain events happen on the device, such as network changes or the user unlocking the screen. Malicious applications can then trigger certain actions within the app based on which broadcast intent was received.

In addition to Android system intents, malicious applications can register for intents broadcasted by other applications. This allows the malware to respond based on actions in other applications. This behavior typically indicates a more intimate knowledge, or potentially the targeting of specific devices, users, or applications.

In Android 8 (API level 26), broadcast intent behavior was changed, limiting the implicit intents that applications can register for in the manifest. In most cases, applications that register through the manifest will no longer receive the broadcasts. Now, applications must register context-specific broadcast receivers while the user is actively using the app.[1]

MobileT1624.001Sub-techniqueObject v1.1 Modified
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Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence Medium

Broadcast Receivers matter because they let an Android app wake up or act when device or application events occur, such as SMS receipt, boot completion, network changes, or screen unlock. For a business, the risk is not the broadcast mechanism itself, which is normal Android behavior, but malicious or unwanted apps using it for persistence or event-driven execution on managed or employee devices.

Executive priority

Prioritize this where Android devices are used for privileged work, financial approval, messaging, field operations, or access to sensitive applications. Leaders should ask whether mobile device governance can identify risky apps, confirm Android OS currency, and provide incident responders with enough evidence to determine whether an app is reacting to system or other-app events. The supplied mitigation relationship points to keeping mobile OS versions current, especially because Android 8/API level 26 introduced restrictions on many manifest-registered implicit broadcasts.

Technical view

This is an Android sub-technique of Event Triggered Execution. SOC, mobile security, and IR teams should validate whether they can inspect installed apps for declared broadcast receivers, understand which receivers are registered at runtime when an app is active, and correlate suspicious app behavior with system or application broadcast events. ATT&CK does not provide detection text for this object, but it does identify DET0711, Detection of Broadcast Receivers, as related detection strategy context. Relationship context also shows repeated use by Android malware and surveillanceware families, so receiver analysis should be part of mobile malware triage rather than treated as inherently malicious by itself.

Likely telemetry

  • Android application package metadata, including manifest-declared broadcast receivers and requested intent filters
  • Runtime or dynamic analysis evidence showing context-registered broadcast receivers while an app is in use
  • Mobile device inventory with installed applications, package names, versions, sources, and Android OS/API level
  • Mobile security or EMM/MDM events for suspicious app behavior, app installation, app update, and policy violations
  • Device event context such as boot completion, SMS receipt, network changes, user unlock, or relevant inter-application broadcasts where available

Detection direction

  • Do not alert solely on the presence of broadcast receivers; legitimate Android applications commonly use them. Focus review on receivers tied to sensitive triggers, unexpected persistence behavior, or actions inconsistent with the app’s business purpose.
  • Tune detection around Android version differences. On Android 8/API level 26 and later, many manifest-registered implicit broadcasts are restricted, so runtime receiver behavior and app-in-use context may be more important.
  • For high-risk apps, compare declared receivers and intent filters against observed behavior during dynamic analysis or sandboxing.
  • Use relationship context to inform triage: the technique is associated in ATT&CK with multiple Android malware categories, including RATs, spyware, banking trojans, adware, ransomware, and surveillanceware, but local evidence is required before concluding maliciousness.
  • Validate whether mobile telemetry covers personally owned or unmanaged Android devices if those devices can access enterprise data; this is a common visibility gap for mobile persistence behaviors.

Mitigation priorities

  • Maintain recent Android OS versions where business constraints allow, aligning with ATT&CK mitigation M1006 Use Recent OS Version.
  • Use mobile device management or equivalent governance to inventory Android OS/API level, installed applications, and app sources for devices accessing enterprise resources.
  • Prioritize review of apps that request broad access or handle sensitive workflows, especially if they register receivers for boot, SMS, unlock, network, or other high-signal events.
  • Restrict enterprise access from devices that cannot meet minimum OS and app governance requirements, where policy permits.
  • Include broadcast receiver analysis in mobile malware response playbooks and application risk reviews rather than relying only on network indicators.
Analyst notes and limits

This object is Android-specific and is a sub-technique of Event Triggered Execution. ATT&CK relationships show use by campaign C0033 and numerous Android software entries, including SpyNote RAT, Pegasus for Android, SpyDealer, FlexiSpy, SimBad, GolfSpy, TrickMo, EventBot, DEFENSOR ID, FakeSpy, Exobot, AndroidOS/MalLocker.B, Android/AdDisplay.Ashas, GPlayed, HenBox, TERRACOTTA, Tiktok Pro, AhRat, and FlixOnline. Those relationships support treating the behavior as relevant to mobile persistence and malware triage, not as proof that any given app is malicious.

ATT&CK provides no official detection text and no tactic value for this object in the supplied fields. The take therefore identifies validation and telemetry priorities rather than guaranteed detections. Determining risk requires local app inventory, Android version data, app behavior analysis, and enterprise mobile access context.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Broadcast Receivers

Adversaries may establish persistence using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Mobile operating systems have means to subscribe to events such as receiving an SMS message, device boot completion, or other device activities.

An intent is a message passed between Android applications or system components. Applications can register to receive broadcast intents at runtime, which are system-wide intents delivered to each app when certain events happen on the device, such as network changes or the user unlocking the screen. Malicious applications can then trigger certain actions within the app based on which broadcast intent was received.

In addition to Android system intents, malicious applications can register for intents broadcasted by other applications. This allows the malware to respond based on actions in other applications. This behavior typically indicates a more intimate knowledge, or potentially the targeting of specific devices, users, or applications.

In Android 8 (API level 26), broadcast intent behavior was changed, limiting the implicit intents that applications can register for in the manifest. In most cases, applications that register through the manifest will no longer receive the broadcasts. Now, applications must register context-specific broadcast receivers while the user is actively using the app.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

2 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Mobile T1624 Event Triggered Execution This object subtechnique of Event Triggered Execution.
Mobile T1402 Broadcast Receivers Broadcast Receivers revoked by this object.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Malware Mobile

S0427: TrickMo

TrickMo a 2FA bypass mobile banking trojan, most likely being distributed by TrickBot. TrickMo has been primarily targeting users located in Germany.[1]

TrickMo is designed to steal transaction authorization numbers (TANs), which are typically used as one-time passwords.[1]

Android
Malware Mobile

S1195: SpyC23

SpyC23 is a mobile malware that has been used by APT-C-23 since at least 2017. SpyC23 has been observed primarily targeting Android devices in the Middle East.[1]

There are multiple close variants of SpyC23, such as VAMP[2], GnatSpy[3], Desert Scorpion and FrozenCell, which add some additional functionality but are not significantly different from the original malware.

Android
Malware Mobile

S0419: SimBad

SimBad was a strain of adware on the Google Play Store, distributed through the RXDroider Software Development Kit. The name "SimBad" was derived from the fact that most of the infected applications were simulator games. The adware was controlled using an instance of the open source framework Parse Server.[1]

Android
Malware Mobile

S0509: FakeSpy

FakeSpy is Android spyware that has been operated by the Chinese threat actor behind the Roaming Mantis campaigns.[1]

Android
Malware Mobile

S0522: Exobot

Exobot is Android banking malware, primarily targeting financial institutions in Germany, Austria, and France.[1]

Android
Malware Mobile

S1103: FlixOnline

FlixOnline is an Android malware, first detected in early 2021, believed to target users of WhatsApp. FlixOnline primarily spreads via automatic replies to a device’s incoming WhatsApp messages.[1]

Android
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · Malware S0305: SpyNote RAT Mobile uses · Malware S0427: TrickMo Mobile uses · Malware S0524: AndroidOS/MalLocker.B Mobile uses · Malware S0316: Pegasus for Android Mobile uses · Malware S1195: SpyC23 Mobile uses · Malware S0419: SimBad Mobile uses · Malware S0509: FakeSpy Mobile uses · Malware S0522: Exobot Mobile uses · Malware S0421: GolfSpy Mobile uses · Malware S0558: Tiktok Pro Mobile mitigates · Mitigation M1006: Use Recent OS Version Mobile uses · Malware S0536: GPlayed Mobile subtechnique of · Technique T1624: Event Triggered Execution Mobile uses · Campaign C0033: C0033 Mobile uses · Malware S1103: FlixOnline Mobile uses · Malware S0544: HenBox Mobile uses · Malware S0545: TERRACOTTA Mobile revoked by · Technique T1402: Broadcast Receivers Mobile uses · Malware S0525: Android/AdDisplay.Ashas Mobile uses · Malware S9005: DocSwap Mobile uses · Tool S0408: FlexiSpy Mobile uses · Malware S1095: AhRat Mobile uses · Malware S0479: DEFENSOR ID Mobile uses · Malware S0324: SpyDealer Mobile
Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Mitigation Mobile

M1006: Use Recent OS Version

New mobile operating system versions bring not only patches against discovered vulnerabilities but also often bring security architecture improvements that provide resilience against potential vulnerabilities or weaknesses that have not yet been discovered. They may also bring improvements that block use of observed adversary techniques.

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
840c2ee94fa20383...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.1 Current bundle 840c2ee94fa2…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Android Changes to System Broadcasts

    Google. (2019, December 27). Broadcasts Overview. Retrieved January 27, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attack T1624.001
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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