T1520: Domain Generation Algorithms
Adversaries may use Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to procedurally generate domain names for command and control communication, and other uses such as malicious application distribution.[1]
DGAs increase the difficulty for defenders to block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.
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Domain Generation Algorithms
Adversaries may use Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to procedurally generate domain names for command and control communication, and other uses such as malicious application distribution.[1]
DGAs increase the difficulty for defenders to block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1637.001 | Domain Generation Algorithms Sub-technique | This object revoked by Domain Generation Algorithms. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
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Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle Revoked | edd99f4727ab… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
securelist rotexy 2018
T. Shishkova, L. Pikman. (2018, November 22). The Rotexy mobile Trojan – banker and ransomware. Retrieved September 23, 2019.
Open source URL -
[2]
Data Driven Security DGA
Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part 2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.
Open source URL -
[3]
mitre-attack T1520Open source URL
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