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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1137.001: Office Template Macros

Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. [1]

Office Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros [2] can be inserted into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.[3][4] Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from remote locations.[5]

Word Normal.dotm location:
C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\Normal.dotm

Excel Personal.xlsb location:
C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\PERSONAL.XLSB

Adversaries may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for Normal.dotm under C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\, or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location.[5]

An adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.

EnterpriseT1137.001Sub-techniqueObject v1.2 Modified
Discuss defensive coverage Back to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

Office Template Macros matter because they turn a common business tool into a persistence point: a modified Word or Excel template can cause code to run when the Office application starts. For leaders, the practical risk is not “macros” in the abstract; it is whether endpoint, Office, and registry monitoring can prove that user profile templates, trusted locations, and Office startup behavior have not been quietly altered after compromise.

Executive priority

Prioritize this where Windows endpoints and Microsoft Office are widely used, especially for users with sensitive access. The business decision is whether macro governance, endpoint behavior prevention, and monitoring of Office startup paths are strong enough to support incident response and audit evidence. Because this is a persistence technique, weak coverage can extend attacker dwell time and complicate containment after an initial compromise.

Technical view

This is a Windows and Office Suite persistence sub-technique under Office Application Startup. Validate monitoring for changes to Word Normal.dotm, Excel PERSONAL.XLSB under XLSTART, Office template directories, and registry-driven template redirection such as GlobalDotName. Also validate whether shared or remote template locations are visible to defenders. ATT&CK provides no official detection text for this object, but relationship context includes detection strategy DET0519, Detect Persistence via Office Template Macro Injection or Registry Hijack, so detection engineering should focus on file modification, macro-bearing template creation, Office startup execution, and registry hijack evidence rather than relying on a single alert type.

Likely telemetry

  • File creation and modification events for user Office template paths, including Normal.dotm and XLSTART/PERSONAL.XLSB
  • Registry modification events for Office template configuration such as GlobalDotName
  • Office process start events correlated with template loading or macro execution indicators
  • Endpoint behavior-prevention events involving Office applications and child processes or suspicious file activity
  • Inventory or configuration evidence for macro policy, trusted documents, and trusted locations

Detection direction

  • Confirm coverage of both default user-profile template paths and alternate Office search-order locations described in the ATT&CK object.
  • Create baselines for legitimate template updates, because normal user customization and Office configuration changes can otherwise create false positives.
  • Tune for suspicious combinations: new or modified macro-capable templates plus subsequent Office startup activity, or registry changes that redirect template loading to unusual locations.
  • Check visibility into trusted locations and trusted documents, since the technique may depend on macro execution being permitted by policy or trust state.
  • Use relationship context from DET0519 to guide detection validation, but do not assume coverage exists without testing local telemetry collection and alert logic.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with macro governance: restrict unrestricted macro execution where business processes allow and review trusted locations/documents.
  • Apply endpoint behavior prevention controls, aligned to M1040, to block or alert on suspicious Office-driven process, file, API, or endpoint behavior.
  • Reduce attack surface, aligned to M1042, by disabling or removing unnecessary Office features, legacy components, or configurations that are not required for business use.
  • Protect and monitor Office template paths and registry settings as controlled configuration items, especially for privileged or high-risk users.
  • Include Office template persistence checks in incident response containment and eradication playbooks so responders do not remove only the initial payload.
Analyst notes and limits

The relationships show this technique as a sub-technique of Office Application Startup and list use by Operation AkaiRyū, MuddyWater, Cobalt Strike, BackConfig, and ROAMINGHOUSE. Those relationships establish that the behavior is relevant across campaign, group, and software reporting, but they should not be read as evidence of current activity in any specific environment. The most actionable local questions are: who can modify Office template paths, where are trusted templates allowed, and can the SOC reconstruct Office startup persistence changes from endpoint and registry telemetry?

ATT&CK does not provide official detection text for this object, so the guidance depends on the supplied description, platforms, persistence tactic, and relationship to DET0519 and mitigations M1040/M1042. Local Office versions, macro policy, endpoint logging depth, and use of shared templates will determine practical detectability.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Office Template Macros

Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. [1]

Office Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros [2] can be inserted into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.[3][4] Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from remote locations.[5]

Word Normal.dotm location:
C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\Normal.dotm

Excel Personal.xlsb location:
C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\PERSONAL.XLSB

Adversaries may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for Normal.dotm under C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\, or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location.[5]

An adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1137 Office Application Startup This object subtechnique of Office Application Startup.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Group Enterprise

G0069: MuddyWater

MuddyWater is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1] Since at least 2017, MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, finance, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East (specifically the UAE and Saudi Arabia), Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America. MuddyWater has reused domains dating back to October 2025, and has a preference for NameCheap and Hosterdaddy Private Limited (AS136557). In late 2025 and early 2026, MuddyWater used commercial satellite internet (i.e., Starlink) for command and control (C2) communication. [2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

Malware Enterprise

S0154: Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.[1]

In addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[1]

LinuxmacOSWindows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

detects · Detection Strategy DET0519: Detect Persistence via Office Template Macro Injection or Registry Hijack Enterprise uses · Group G0069: MuddyWater Enterprise uses · Malware S9026: ROAMINGHOUSE Enterprise uses · Malware S0475: BackConfig Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint Enterprise subtechnique of · Technique T1137: Office Application Startup Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program Enterprise uses · Campaign C0060: Operation AkaiRyū Enterprise uses · Malware S0154: Cobalt Strike Enterprise
Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Mitigation Enterprise

M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

Behavior Prevention on Endpoint refers to the use of technologies and strategies to detect and block potentially malicious activities by analyzing the behavior of processes, files, API calls, and other endpoint events. Rather than relying solely on known signatures, this approach leverages heuristics, machine learning, and real-time monitoring to identify anomalous patterns indicative of an attack. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Suspicious Process Behavior:

- Implementation: Use Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools to monitor and block processes exhibiting unusual behavior, such as privilege escalation attempts. - Use Case: An attacker uses a known vulnerability to spawn a privileged process from a user-level application. The endpoint tool detects the abnormal parent-child process relationship and blocks the action.

Unauthorized File Access:

- Implementation: Leverage Data Loss Prevention (DLP) or endpoint tools to block processes attempting to access sensitive files without proper authorization. - Use Case: A process tries to read or modify a sensitive file located in a restricted directory, such as /etc/shadow on Linux or the SAM registry hive on Windows. The endpoint tool identifies this anomalous behavior and prevents it.

Abnormal API Calls:

- Implementation: Implement runtime analysis tools to monitor API calls and block those associated with malicious activities. - Use Case: A process dynamically injects itself into another process to hijack its execution. The endpoint detects the abnormal use of APIs like `OpenProcess` and `WriteProcessMemory` and terminates the offending process.

Exploit Prevention:

- Implementation: Use behavioral exploit prevention tools to detect and block exploits attempting to gain unauthorized access. - Use Case: A buffer overflow exploit is launched against a vulnerable application. The endpoint detects the anomalous memory write operation and halts the process.

Mitigation Enterprise

M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program

Disable or remove unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software, features, or services to reduce the attack surface and prevent abuse by adversaries. This involves identifying software or features that are no longer needed or that could be exploited and ensuring they are either removed or properly disabled. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Remove Legacy Software:

- Use Case: Disable or remove older versions of software that no longer receive updates or security patches (e.g., legacy Java, Adobe Flash). - Implementation: A company removes Flash Player from all employee systems after it has reached its end-of-life date.

Disable Unused Features:

- Use Case: Turn off unnecessary operating system features like SMBv1, Telnet, or RDP if they are not required. - Implementation: Disable SMBv1 in a Windows environment to mitigate vulnerabilities like EternalBlue.

Control Applications Installed by Users:

- Use Case: Prevent users from installing unauthorized software via group policies or other management tools. - Implementation: Block user installations of unauthorized file-sharing applications (e.g., BitTorrent clients) in an enterprise environment.

Remove Unnecessary Services:

- Use Case: Identify and disable unnecessary default services running on endpoints, servers, or network devices. - Implementation: Disable unused administrative shares (e.g., C$, ADMIN$) on workstations.

Restrict Add-ons and Plugins:

- Use Case: Remove or disable browser plugins and add-ons that are not needed for business purposes. - Implementation: Disable Java and ActiveX plugins in web browsers to prevent drive-by attacks.

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
4161daa35036d4ae...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.2 Current bundle 4161daa35036…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Microsoft Change Normal Template

    Microsoft. (n.d.). Change the Normal template (Normal.dotm). Retrieved July 3, 2017.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    MSDN VBA in Office

    Austin, J. (2017, June 6). Getting Started with VBA in Office. Retrieved July 3, 2017.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    enigma0x3 normal.dotm

    Nelson, M. (2014, January 23). Maintaining Access with normal.dotm. Retrieved July 3, 2017.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Hexacorn Office Template Macros

    Hexacorn. (2017, April 17). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 62. Retrieved July 3, 2017.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    GlobalDotName Jun 2019

    Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    CrowdStrike Outlook Forms

    Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    Outlook Today Home Page

    Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    mitre-attack T1137.001
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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