T1137: Office Application Startup
Adversaries may leverage Microsoft Office-based applications for persistence between startups. Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started; this can include the use of Office Template Macros and add-ins.
A variety of features have been discovered in Outlook that can be abused to obtain persistence, such as Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page.[1] These persistence mechanisms can work within Outlook or be used through Office 365.[2]
Analyst context for executives and security teams
Office Application Startup persistence matters because it turns normal Microsoft Office or Outlook startup activity into a recurring foothold. In enterprises where Office is widely used, a malicious template macro, add-in-related mechanism, Outlook rule, form, Home Page setting, or Office-related registry hook can survive reboots and re-open every time the user starts the application. For leaders, the issue is not just malware execution; it is whether endpoint, mailbox, and Office configuration controls can prove that common productivity tools are not being used as persistence infrastructure.
Executive priority
Prioritize this technique where Microsoft Office and Outlook are business-critical, especially in Windows environments and organizations using Outlook or Office 365. The business question is whether security teams can inventory and validate Office startup behavior, mailbox rules/forms, legacy Outlook features, and unusual Office-related configuration changes before an incident becomes prolonged. This also supports audit and compliance evidence: show that Office is configured securely, unnecessary legacy features are disabled where possible, software is updated, and endpoint behavior prevention is monitored and tuned.
Technical view
T1137 is an enterprise persistence technique for Windows and Office Suite environments. The supplied sub-technique context points defenders toward Office template macros, the Office Test registry key, Outlook Forms, Outlook Home Page, and Outlook Rules. MITRE does not provide official detection text for the parent technique, but the related detection strategy DET0398 indicates validation should focus on Office startup-based persistence via macros, forms, and registry hooks. SOC and IR teams should confirm visibility across both endpoint state and mailbox/Office configuration state, because some mechanisms may live in local files or registry locations while others may be associated with Outlook or Office 365 mailbox features.
Likely telemetry
- Endpoint file and configuration changes involving Office templates and startup-related Office content
- Windows registry telemetry for Office-related startup or test/debug loading locations, including non-default keys where applicable
- Office application process start events and child process behavior from Word, Excel, Outlook, or other Office applications
- Macro execution or Office automation activity where collected
- Outlook mailbox configuration evidence, including rules, custom forms, and Home Page-related settings
Detection direction
- Validate whether DET0398-style coverage exists for macros, Outlook forms, and Office-related registry hooks rather than assuming generic malware alerts cover this technique.
- Baseline legitimate Office template, rule, form, and mailbox customization activity; false positives are likely in environments that use approved macros, custom forms, or automated mail handling.
- Hunt for Office startup events followed by unexpected code execution behavior, suspicious child processes, or newly introduced persistence artifacts.
- Correlate endpoint evidence with Outlook/Office 365 or Exchange configuration changes; endpoint-only monitoring may miss mailbox-resident persistence mechanisms.
- Review legacy Outlook Home Page and custom form usage where present, because uncommon features can become blind spots if not inventoried or logged.
Mitigation priorities
- Harden Office and Outlook configuration first: restrict or remove unnecessary features, legacy capabilities, and risky customizations where business use does not justify them.
- Keep Office, Windows, and related software updated to reduce exposure from known security gaps and legacy behavior.
- Use endpoint behavior-prevention controls to block or alert on suspicious Office process behavior, file changes, registry activity, and API patterns rather than relying only on signatures.
- Review approved macro, template, add-in, Outlook rule, and custom form governance so exceptions are documented and auditable.
- During incident response, include mailbox configuration review alongside endpoint persistence checks so Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page settings are not overlooked.
Analyst notes and limits
The relationship context shows known ATT&CK group usage by Gamaredon Group and APT32, but that should be used for threat-informed prioritization only, not as evidence of current activity in any environment. The parent object has no official detection text, so practical coverage should be validated through the related DET0398 strategy and local telemetry testing.
This take is based only on the supplied ATT&CK object, references, and relationships. It does not prove exploitation in a specific organization, guarantee that a given control detects the behavior, or identify all possible Office startup mechanisms beyond those represented in the supplied sub-techniques and references. Local Office version, Outlook/Office 365 configuration, logging, and business use of macros or custom forms determine actual risk and coverage.
Office Application Startup
Adversaries may leverage Microsoft Office-based applications for persistence between startups. Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started; this can include the use of Office Template Macros and add-ins.
A variety of features have been discovered in Outlook that can be abused to obtain persistence, such as Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page.[1] These persistence mechanisms can work within Outlook or be used through Office 365.[2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1137.002 | Office Test Sub-technique | Office Test subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1137.001 | Office Template Macros Sub-technique | Office Template Macros subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1137.004 | Outlook Home Page Sub-technique | Outlook Home Page subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1137.003 | Outlook Forms Sub-technique | Outlook Forms subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1137.006 | Add-ins Sub-technique | Add-ins subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1137.005 | Outlook Rules Sub-technique | Outlook Rules subtechnique of this object. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0050: APT32
APT32 is a suspected Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims.[1][2][3]
G0047: Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group is a suspected Russian cyber espionage group that has targeted military, law enforcement, judiciary, non-profit, and non-governmental organizations in Ukraine since at least 2013. The name Gamaredon Group derives from a misspelling of the word "Armageddon," found in early campaigns.[1][2][3][4][5]
In November 2021, the Ukrainian government publicly attributed Gamaredon Group to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 18, an assessment later supported by multiple independent cybersecurity researchers. [6][5]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.4 | Current bundle | 0f8a5bcdd72c… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
SensePost Ruler GitHub
SensePost. (2016, August 18). Ruler: A tool to abuse Exchange services. Retrieved February 4, 2019.
Open source URL -
[2]
TechNet O365 Outlook Rules
Koeller, B.. (2018, February 21). Defending Against Rules and Forms Injection. Retrieved November 5, 2019.
Open source URL -
[3]
CrowdStrike Outlook Forms
Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.
Open source URL -
[4]
Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms
Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.
Open source URL -
[5]
Outlook Today Home Page
Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.
Open source URL -
[6]
SensePost NotRuler
SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.
Open source URL -
[7]
mitre-attack T1137Open source URL
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