S1137: Moneybird
Analyst context for executives and security teams
Moneybird matters because it is a Windows ransomware variant associated in ATT&CK with Agrius operations and linked to data encryption for impact. For leaders, the practical issue is not just malware identification; it is whether the organization can prevent, detect, contain, and recover from file-encryption activity before business operations, evidence retention, and incident decision-making are disrupted.
Executive priority
Prioritize Moneybird as a ransomware-readiness validation item: confirm that critical Windows environments have resilient backups, practiced restoration paths, endpoint visibility, and incident response playbooks for encryption events. Because ATT&CK provides no official detection guidance for this software, executives should ask for evidence of coverage against the related behaviors—embedded payload concealment and data encryption for impact—rather than a claim of tool-name detection.
Technical view
SOC and IR teams should validate controls against the supplied relationships: T1027.009 Embedded Payloads and T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact. On Windows, focus on whether endpoint and file-system telemetry can surface suspicious executable content with embedded payloads, abnormal file rewrite/encryption patterns, ransom-note creation, and process behavior consistent with ransomware impact. Detection engineering should treat the Moneybird name, ransom-note strings, and executable strings as supporting context, not sufficient coverage by themselves.
Likely telemetry
- Windows endpoint process execution telemetry
- File creation, modification, rename, and mass-write activity on local and accessible drives
- Endpoint security alerts for suspicious or packed/embedded payload content
- Ransom note file creation or strings referencing Moneybird where available
- Hash, filename, path, command-line, parent process, and user context for suspicious executables
Detection direction
- Validate behavior-based detection for rapid or high-volume file encryption/modification rather than relying only on malware family names.
- Review alerting for executables or scripts carrying embedded payloads, with tuning to reduce false positives from legitimate installers and self-extracting archives.
- Correlate endpoint process activity with file-system changes and ransom-note creation to distinguish ransomware impact from normal bulk file operations.
- Ensure SOC triage captures user, host, share, and process lineage so responders can quickly decide isolation and recovery steps.
- Document that ATT&CK provides no official detection text for Moneybird; any local analytics should be tested against the related techniques, not assumed from the ATT&CK entry alone.
Mitigation priorities
- Maintain and regularly test offline or otherwise resilient backups for systems and data whose loss would affect business operations.
- Harden Windows endpoints with least privilege, application control where feasible, and endpoint protection capable of inspecting suspicious executable content.
- Limit write access to shared data stores and monitor privileged or service accounts that can modify large data volumes.
- Prepare ransomware response procedures covering host isolation, credential risk review, evidence preservation, restoration sequencing, and executive communications.
- Use the Moneybird mapping to validate ransomware control coverage in tabletop exercises, audit evidence, and incident response readiness reviews.
Analyst notes and limits
The ATT&CK object identifies Moneybird as a C++ ransomware variant, associated with Agrius operations, with Windows listed as the platform. The only supplied behavioral relationships are Embedded Payloads and Data Encrypted for Impact, so defensive interpretation should center on ransomware impact readiness and payload-concealment visibility.
ATT&CK supplies no official detection guidance, aliases, labels, or malware-specific tactics for Moneybird in this object. The take does not infer active exploitation, victim exposure, or guaranteed detection. Local telemetry, tested analytics, backup architecture, and incident response evidence are required to determine actual organizational coverage.
Moneybird
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1027.009 | Embedded Payloads Sub-technique | Moneybird contains a configuration blob embedded in the malware itself.CitationCheckPoint Agrius 2023 |
| Enterprise | T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | Moneybird targets a common set of file types such as documents, certificates, and database files for encryption while avoiding executable, dynamic linked libraries, and similar items.CitationCheckPoint Agrius 2023 |
Groups, software, and campaigns
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 42e9e1734ae5… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
CheckPoint Agrius 2023
Marc Salinas Fernandez & Jiri Vinopal. (2023, May 23). AGRIUS DEPLOYS MONEYBIRD IN TARGETED ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAELI ORGANIZATIONS. Retrieved May 21, 2024.
Open source URL -
[2]
mitre-attack S1137Open source URL
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