S1046: PowGoop
PowGoop is a loader that consists of a DLL loader and a PowerShell-based downloader; it has been used by MuddyWater as their main loader.[1][2]
Analyst context for executives and security teams
PowGoop matters because it represents a Windows loader pattern combining a DLL loader with a PowerShell-based downloader. For leaders, the business issue is not just one malware name; it is whether the organization can reliably see suspicious PowerShell activity, DLL abuse, and web-based command-and-control traffic before a loader enables follow-on activity. MITRE reports PowGoop has been used by MuddyWater, so it is also useful for threat-informed validation where organizations track exposure to espionage-oriented intrusion sets.
Executive priority
Prioritize PowGoop as a readiness check for Windows endpoint monitoring, PowerShell governance, and network egress visibility. Executives should ask whether SOC and incident response teams can prove collection and analysis of PowerShell logs, DLL load behavior, suspicious masquerading, encoded or encrypted outbound traffic, and HTTP/S-like command-and-control patterns. This is especially relevant for organizations that need defensible compliance evidence around endpoint logging, incident response preparedness, and control effectiveness against loader-stage malware.
Technical view
ATT&CK lists PowGoop as Windows malware consisting of a DLL loader and PowerShell-based downloader, with relationships to PowerShell execution, DLL abuse, masquerading, web protocols, non-standard encoding, deobfuscation/decoding, and encrypted channels. Detection engineering should validate behavior chains rather than relying on the malware name: PowerShell execution that retrieves or launches content, unusual DLL loading or side-loading patterns, files or resources named or placed to look legitimate, and outbound web traffic that is encoded, encrypted, or otherwise inconsistent with normal application behavior. Because ATT&CK provides no official detection text for this software object, local baselining and relationship-driven analytics are required.
Likely telemetry
- Windows endpoint process creation events, especially PowerShell and child process activity
- PowerShell script block, module, transcription, or equivalent command telemetry where available
- DLL load telemetry and endpoint detection records showing unusual library paths or host processes
- File creation, rename, and path metadata useful for identifying masquerading or legitimate-looking resource names
- Network proxy, firewall, DNS, and HTTP/S metadata for outbound web protocol use
Detection direction
- Build detections around the related ATT&CK behaviors: T1059.001 PowerShell, T1574.001 DLL abuse, T1036/T1036.005 masquerading, T1071.001 web protocols, T1132.002 non-standard encoding, T1140 deobfuscation/decoding, and T1573 encrypted channel.
- Correlate PowerShell downloader-like activity with subsequent DLL loading, new file creation, or outbound web communications rather than treating each signal in isolation.
- Tune for false positives from legitimate administration, software deployment, and security tooling that use PowerShell or load DLLs from expected paths.
- Validate that encrypted or web-protocol egress monitoring can distinguish expected business applications from unusual destinations, rare user-agent patterns, abnormal request structure, or encoded content indicators where available.
- Use the MuddyWater relationship as threat-intelligence context for prioritization, but do not assume attribution from PowGoop-like behavior alone.
Mitigation priorities
- Harden and monitor PowerShell usage on Windows systems, emphasizing logging, constrained administrative use, and review of script execution patterns.
- Improve endpoint visibility for DLL loading, suspicious file placement, and masquerading in trusted-looking directories or names.
- Restrict and monitor outbound web traffic using egress controls, proxy logging, DNS visibility, and review of unusual encrypted sessions.
- Maintain incident response playbooks for loader-stage malware that include host isolation criteria, collection of PowerShell and DLL artifacts, and network indicator scoping.
- Use threat-informed control validation to test whether SOC workflows connect endpoint execution, file masquerading, and command-and-control telemetry into a single investigation.
Analyst notes and limits
The most useful defensive interpretation of PowGoop is as a loader tradecraft bundle: DLL loading, PowerShell download activity, masquerading, and web-based encrypted or encoded communications. ATT&CK identifies MuddyWater as using this malware, but local investigations should rely on observed behavior and evidence rather than attribution assumptions.
The supplied ATT&CK object has no official detection guidance, no aliases, no labels, and no explicit tactics on the malware object itself. The technical direction above is derived from the official description and listed relationships. Environment-specific baselines, logging configuration, and retention determine whether these behaviors can actually be detected or investigated.
PowGoop
PowGoop is a loader that consists of a DLL loader and a PowerShell-based downloader; it has been used by MuddyWater as their main loader.[1][2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1573 | Encrypted Channel | PowGoop can receive encrypted commands from C2.CitationDHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1036 | Masquerading | PowGoop has disguised a PowerShell script as a .dat file (goopdate.dat).CitationDHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web Protocols Sub-technique | PowGoop can send HTTP GET requests to malicious servers.CitationCYBERCOM Iranian Intel Cyber January 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShell Sub-technique | PowGoop has the ability to use PowerShell scripts to execute commands.CitationDHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1574.001 | DLL Sub-technique | PowGoop can side-load `Goopdate.dll` into `GoogleUpdate.exe`.CitationDHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022CitationCYBERCOM Iranian Intel Cyber January 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | PowGoop can decrypt PowerShell scripts for execution.CitationDHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022CitationCYBERCOM Iranian Intel Cyber January 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location Sub-technique | PowGoop has used a DLL named Goopdate.dll to impersonate a legitimate Google update file.CitationDHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1132.002 | Non-Standard Encoding Sub-technique | PowGoop can use a modified Base64 encoding mechanism to send data to and from the C2 server.CitationCYBERCOM Iranian Intel Cyber January 2022 |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0069: MuddyWater
MuddyWater is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1] Since at least 2017, MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, finance, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East (specifically the UAE and Saudi Arabia), Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America. MuddyWater has reused domains dating back to October 2025, and has a preference for NameCheap and Hosterdaddy Private Limited (AS136557). In late 2025 and early 2026, MuddyWater used commercial satellite internet (i.e., Starlink) for command and control (C2) communication. [2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 21d11ac7d735… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022
FBI, CISA, CNMF, NCSC-UK. (2022, February 24). Iranian Government-Sponsored Actors Conduct Cyber Operations Against Global Government and Commercial Networks. Retrieved September 27, 2022.
Open source URL -
[2]
CYBERCOM Iranian Intel Cyber January 2022
Cyber National Mission Force. (2022, January 12). Iranian intel cyber suite of malware uses open source tools. Retrieved September 30, 2022.
Open source URL -
[3]
mitre-attack S1046Open source URL
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