Live Active security incident? Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Tool

S1040: Rclone

Rclone is a command line program for syncing files with cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Google Drive, Amazon S3, and MEGA. Rclone has been used in a number of ransomware campaigns, including those associated with the Conti and DarkSide Ransomware-as-a-Service operations.[1][2][3][4][5]

EnterpriseS1040ToolObject v1.3 Modified
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

Rclone matters because it is a legitimate cross-platform cloud-sync tool that can also move large amounts of organizational data to services such as Dropbox, Google Drive, Amazon S3, and MEGA. In ATT&CK, it is linked to ransomware and extortion-related activity, so its presence should not automatically be treated as malicious, but unmanaged or unexpected use can become a material data-loss and incident-response concern.

Executive priority

Leaders should ask whether Rclone is approved anywhere, who owns that business use, and whether cloud egress from endpoints and servers is governed and logged. The decision value is in separating sanctioned backup/sync activity from possible data staging or exfiltration before ransomware or extortion pressure. This supports resilience planning, incident scoping, cloud governance, and audit evidence around data movement controls.

Technical view

Rclone is listed for Linux, Windows, and macOS. ATT&CK relationships connect it to File and Directory Discovery, Archive via Utility, Data Transfer Size Limits, Exfiltration Over Encrypted or Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocols, and Exfiltration to Cloud Storage. SOC and IR teams should validate host process execution, command-line arguments, file access patterns, archive creation, and outbound connections to cloud storage destinations. Because MITRE provides no official detection text for this object, local baselining and allowlisting are important.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint process creation telemetry including executable path, parent process, user, command line, and working directory
  • File system telemetry showing large reads, directory enumeration, archive creation, or access to sensitive shares
  • Network and proxy logs for outbound transfers to cloud storage providers
  • DNS and TLS metadata associated with cloud storage destinations
  • Cloud storage access logs where organizational accounts or sanctioned services are involved

Detection direction

  • Inventory approved Rclone usage first; alerting without business context will create false positives in environments that use it for backup or administration.
  • Prioritize unexpected Rclone execution on servers, privileged workstations, domain-adjacent systems, or hosts handling sensitive data.
  • Correlate Rclone process activity with archive creation, file and directory discovery, and high-volume outbound transfers.
  • Look for transfer shaping or chunking patterns consistent with the related Data Transfer Size Limits technique, but avoid relying only on volume thresholds.
  • Tune detections around unusual destinations, first-time use, nonstandard install paths, suspicious parent processes, and execution by accounts that do not normally perform cloud sync operations.

Mitigation priorities

  • Establish whether Rclone is permitted, restricted, or prohibited and document approved owners and use cases.
  • Limit unsanctioned cloud storage access through network, proxy, and cloud governance controls where operationally feasible.
  • Apply least privilege to file shares and sensitive repositories so any sync utility cannot access more data than required.
  • Ensure endpoint and network logging captures process, command-line, file access, and outbound transfer evidence needed for incident scoping.
  • Include Rclone and similar legitimate sync utilities in ransomware/extortion response playbooks and tabletop exercises.
Analyst notes and limits

ATT&CK identifies Rclone as legitimate software used in multiple ransomware-related contexts and by several listed groups and campaigns. The most useful defensive framing is not the binary alone, but the combination of Rclone execution, sensitive data access, archive activity, and outbound cloud transfer behavior.

MITRE does not provide official detection guidance for this object, and the object has no tactics listed directly. Conclusions about maliciousness require local evidence such as approved software inventory, user role, destination, data accessed, and timing relative to other intrusion activity.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Rclone

Rclone is a command line program for syncing files with cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Google Drive, Amazon S3, and MEGA. Rclone has been used in a number of ransomware campaigns, including those associated with the Conti and DarkSide Ransomware-as-a-Service operations.[1][2][3][4][5]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

6 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Sub-technique

Rclone can exfiltrate data to cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Google Drive, Amazon S3, and MEGA.CitationRcloneCitationDFIR Conti Bazar Nov 2021

Enterprise T1083 File and Directory Discovery

Rclone can list files and directories with the `ls`, `lsd`, and `lsl` commands.CitationRclone

Enterprise T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits

The Rclone "chunker" overlay supports splitting large files in smaller chunks during upload to circumvent size limits.CitationRcloneCitationDFIR Conti Bazar Nov 2021

Enterprise T1560.001 Archive via Utility Sub-technique

Rclone can compress files using `gzip` prior to exfiltration.CitationRclone

Enterprise T1048.002 Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Sub-technique

Rclone can exfiltrate data over SFTP or HTTPS via WebDAV.CitationRclone

Enterprise T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol Sub-technique

Rclone can exfiltrate data over FTP or HTTP, including HTTP via WebDAV.CitationRclone

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Group Enterprise

G0069: MuddyWater

MuddyWater is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1] Since at least 2017, MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, finance, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East (specifically the UAE and Saudi Arabia), Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America. MuddyWater has reused domains dating back to October 2025, and has a preference for NameCheap and Hosterdaddy Private Limited (AS136557). In late 2025 and early 2026, MuddyWater used commercial satellite internet (i.e., Starlink) for command and control (C2) communication. [2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

Group Enterprise

G1015: Scattered Spider

Scattered Spider is a native English-speaking cybercriminal group active since at least 2022. [1] [2] The group initially targeted customer relationship management (CRM) providers, business process outsourcing (BPO) firms, and telecommunications and technology companies before expanding in 2023 to gaming, hospitality, retail, managed service provider (MSP), manufacturing, and financial sectors. [2] Scattered Spider relies heavily on social engineering, including impersonating IT and help-desk staff, to gain initial access, bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA), and compromise enterprise networks. The group has adapted its tooling to evade endpoint detection and response (EDR) defenses and used ransomware for financial gain. [3] [4] [5] Scattered Spider had expanded into hybrid cloud and identity environments, using help-desk impersonation and MFA bypass to obtain administrator access in Okta, AWS, and Office 365. [6]

Group Enterprise

G0090: WIRTE

WIRTE is a cyberespionage actor, believed to be a subgroup of the Hamas-affiliated Gaza Cybergang, that has been active since at least August 2018. WIRTE has targeted diplomatic, financial, military, legal, and technology organizations across the Middle East, North Africa, and in Europe to gather intelligence. WIRTE has remained persistently active despite the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict and has expanded their operations to include wiper malware attacks against Israeli targets.[1][2][3][4]

Group Enterprise

G1051: Medusa Group

Medusa Group has been active since at least 2021 and was initially operated as a closed ransomware group before evolving into a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation. Some reporting indicates that certain attacks may still be conducted directly by the ransomware’s core developers. Public sources have also referred to the group as “Spearwing” or “Medusa Actors.” [1] [2] Medusa Group employs living-off-the-land techniques, frequently leveraging publicly available tools and common remote management software to conduct operations. The group engages in double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data prior to encryption and threatening to publish stolen information if ransom demands are not met. [3] For initial access, Medusa Group has exploited publicly known vulnerabilities, conducted phishing campaigns, and used credentials or access purchased from Initial Access Brokers (IABs). The group is opportunistic and has targeted a wide range of sectors globally. [4]

Group Enterprise

G1053: Storm-0501

Storm-0501 is a financially motivated cyber criminal group that uses commodity and open-source tools to conduct ransomware operations. Storm-0501 has been active since 2021 and has previously been affiliated with Sabbath Ransomware and other Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) variants such as Hive, BlackCat, Hunters International, LockBit 3.0, and Embargo ransomware.[1][2][3][4]

Group Enterprise

G1003: Ember Bear

Ember Bear is a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2020, linked to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 161st Specialist Training Center (Unit 29155).[1] Ember Bear has primarily focused operations against Ukrainian government and telecommunication entities, but has also operated against critical infrastructure entities in Europe and the Americas.[2] Ember Bear conducted the WhisperGate destructive wiper attacks against Ukraine in early 2022.[3][4][1] There is some confusion as to whether Ember Bear overlaps with another Russian-linked entity referred to as Saint Bear. At present available evidence strongly suggests these are distinct activities with different behavioral profiles.[2][5]

Group Enterprise

G1024: Akira

Akira is a ransomware variant and ransomware deployment entity active since at least March 2023.[1] Akira uses compromised credentials to access single-factor external access mechanisms such as VPNs for initial access, then various publicly-available tools and techniques for lateral movement.[1][2] Akira operations are associated with "double extortion" ransomware activity, where data is exfiltrated from victim environments prior to encryption, with threats to publish files if a ransom is not paid. Technical analysis of Akira ransomware indicates variants capable of targeting Windows or VMWare ESXi hypervisors and multiple overlaps with Conti ransomware.[3][4][5]

Group Enterprise

G1021: Cinnamon Tempest

Cinnamon Tempest is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2021 deploying multiple strains of ransomware based on the leaked Babuk source code. Cinnamon Tempest does not operate their ransomware on an affiliate model or purchase access but appears to act independently in all stages of the attack lifecycle. Based on victimology, the short lifespan of each ransomware variant, and use of malware attributed to government-sponsored threat groups, Cinnamon Tempest may be motivated by intellectual property theft or cyberespionage rather than financial gain.[1][2][3][4]

Campaign Enterprise

C0015: C0015

C0015 was a ransomware intrusion during which the unidentified attackers used Bazar, Cobalt Strike, and Conti, along with other tools, over a 5 day period. Security researchers assessed the actors likely used the widely-circulated Conti ransomware playbook based on the observed pattern of activity and operator errors.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.3
Created
Modified
Raw hash
f5c32e9bf374e0c3...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.3 Current bundle f5c32e9bf374…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Rclone

    Nick Craig-Wood. (n.d.). Rclone syncs your files to cloud storage. Retrieved August 30, 2022.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Rclone Wars

    Justin Schoenfeld and Aaron Didier. (2021, May 4). Rclone Wars: Transferring leverage in a ransomware attack. Retrieved August 30, 2022.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Detecting Rclone

    Aaron Greetham. (2021, May 27). Detecting Rclone – An Effective Tool for Exfiltration. Retrieved August 30, 2022.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    DarkSide Ransomware Gang

    Ramarcus Baylor. (2021, May 12). DarkSide Ransomware Gang: An Overview. Retrieved August 30, 2022.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    DFIR Conti Bazar Nov 2021

    DFIR Report. (2021, November 29). CONTInuing the Bazar Ransomware Story. Retrieved September 29, 2022.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    mitre-attack S1040
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.