S0486: Bonadan
Analyst context for executives and security teams
Bonadan matters because it is described as a malicious OpenSSH variant for Linux: a trusted remote administration component can become both a backdoor and a credential-theft point. The added cryptocurrency-mining capability also makes this relevant to availability and operating cost, not just confidentiality.
Executive priority
Prioritize assurance around Linux SSH integrity, privileged access, and incident readiness. Leaders should ask whether teams can prove OpenSSH binaries are trusted, detect unauthorized changes to host software, identify abnormal resource consumption, and respond to possible credential exposure if a Linux remote-access service is compromised.
Technical view
SOC and IR teams should validate coverage around the related ATT&CK behaviors: compromised host software binaries for persistence, command/script execution, system/user/process/network discovery, ingress tool transfer, encrypted command-and-control, and compute hijacking. Because no official ATT&CK detection text is provided, detection should be built from local baselines: known-good OpenSSH packages and hashes, normal Linux admin command patterns, expected SSH service behavior, normal egress destinations, and expected CPU/resource profiles.
Likely telemetry
- Linux package inventory and software provenance records for OpenSSH
- File integrity monitoring or endpoint telemetry for SSH-related binaries and configuration changes
- Process execution logs for shell commands and discovery utilities
- Linux authentication and SSH service logs
- Network connection metadata, especially outbound sessions and file transfer activity
Detection direction
- Compare OpenSSH binaries and related files against trusted package sources and approved baselines.
- Correlate unexpected SSH binary changes with process execution, new outbound connections, and discovery commands.
- Tune for Linux administrative false positives: commands for user, process, system, and network discovery may be legitimate but become higher risk when clustered with binary tampering or unusual egress.
- Monitor for ingress tool transfer and encrypted outbound traffic using metadata and destination reputation where content inspection is not available.
- Investigate sustained high compute usage on Linux systems, especially when paired with unknown processes or recent SSH software changes.
Mitigation priorities
- Establish trusted software supply and package management for OpenSSH on Linux systems.
- Use file integrity monitoring and change control for remote-access binaries and configurations.
- Limit administrative privileges and SSH access paths to reduce the blast radius of compromised remote-access software.
- Restrict unnecessary outbound connectivity and file transfer paths from servers.
- Prepare IR procedures for suspected SSH backdoor cases, including host isolation, trusted rebuild or binary replacement, and credential rotation due to the described credential-stealing capability.
Analyst notes and limits
The ATT&CK object identifies Bonadan as a malicious OpenSSH version active since at least 2018, with a custom backdoor, cryptocurrency-mining module, and credential-stealing module. Relationship context links it to discovery, execution, command-and-control, persistence, and impact techniques, which should guide defensive validation.
MITRE provides no official detection text here and the supplied fields do not include hashes, indicators, delivery method, specific commands, infrastructure, or victim context. Local Linux telemetry and trusted software baselines are required to determine exposure or detection coverage.
Bonadan
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1573.001 | Symmetric Cryptography Sub-technique | Bonadan can XOR-encrypt C2 communications.CitationESET ForSSHe December 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | Bonadan has discovered the OS version, CPU model, and RAM size of the system it has been installed on.CitationESET ForSSHe December 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | Bonadan can find the external IP address of the infected host.CitationESET ForSSHe December 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1496.001 | Compute Hijacking Sub-technique | Bonadan can download an additional module which has a cryptocurrency mining extension.CitationESET ForSSHe December 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1554 | Compromise Host Software Binary | Bonadan has maliciously altered the OpenSSH binary on targeted systems to create a backdoor.CitationESET ForSSHe December 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Bonadan can download additional modules from the C2 server.CitationESET ForSSHe December 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | Bonadan has discovered the username of the user running the backdoor.CitationESET ForSSHe December 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | Bonadan can create bind and reverse shells on the infected system.CitationESET ForSSHe December 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | Bonadan can use the |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 639b22165659… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
ESET ForSSHe December 2018
Dumont, R., M.Léveillé, M., Porcher, H. (2018, December 1). THE DARK SIDE OF THE FORSSHE A landscape of OpenSSH backdoors. Retrieved July 16, 2020.
Open source URL -
[2]
mitre-attack S0486Open source URL
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