S0235: CrossRAT
CrossRAT is a cross platform RAT.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
CrossRAT matters because it is described by ATT&CK as a cross-platform remote access trojan spanning Linux, Windows, and macOS. For leaders, the practical issue is not a single operating system control gap: organizations need to know whether endpoint visibility, persistence monitoring, and incident response playbooks work consistently across mixed fleets. Its ATT&CK relationships emphasize discovery, screen capture, and OS-specific logon persistence mechanisms.
Executive priority
Prioritize CrossRAT as a coverage-validation case for heterogeneous endpoint environments. Security leaders should ask whether SOC and IR teams can prove collection and detection for Windows Run Keys or Startup Folder changes, macOS Launch Agents, Linux XDG Autostart entries, file and directory discovery, and screen capture behavior. This is useful for resilience planning, audit evidence, and budget decisions because weak non-Windows telemetry or inconsistent endpoint baselines can leave material gaps in detection and response.
Technical view
ATT&CK provides no dedicated detection text for CrossRAT, so defenders should pivot from the mapped techniques. Validate monitoring for T1083 File and Directory Discovery, T1113 Screen Capture, T1543.001 macOS Launch Agent persistence, T1547.001 Windows Registry Run Keys or Startup Folder persistence, and T1547.013 Linux XDG Autostart Entries. Because the malware is listed for Linux, Windows, and macOS, detection engineering should compare control depth across all three rather than assuming Windows-centered coverage is sufficient.
Likely telemetry
- Endpoint process execution and command-line activity across Linux, Windows, and macOS
- File system enumeration activity and access to sensitive directories or network shares
- Screenshot or screen-capture API, utility, or process activity where available
- Windows Registry Run Key changes and Startup Folder file creation or modification
- macOS LaunchAgent plist creation or modification in system and user LaunchAgents paths
Detection direction
- Build detections from the related ATT&CK techniques rather than from a CrossRAT-specific signature, since no official detection guidance is provided.
- Validate OS-specific persistence rules separately for Windows, macOS, and Linux; a pass on one platform should not be treated as coverage for the others.
- Tune discovery detections to distinguish administrative inventory activity from unusual enumeration by user context, process lineage, timing, and target locations.
- For screen capture, look for unusual screenshot utilities, APIs, or processes, but account for legitimate collaboration, support, and accessibility tools.
- Use the Dark Caracal relationship only as threat-intelligence context from ATT&CK; do not infer current activity or local exposure without environment evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Establish and enforce endpoint logging standards for Linux, Windows, and macOS before relying on detections.
- Harden and monitor user-logon persistence locations: Windows Run Keys and Startup Folder, macOS Launch Agents, and Linux XDG Autostart entries.
- Maintain least-privilege endpoint administration so user-context persistence has reduced operational impact.
- Create IR checklists that include cross-platform persistence review, file discovery traces, and screen-capture evidence collection.
- Use the mapped techniques to test SOC coverage and document compliance evidence for endpoint monitoring controls.
Analyst notes and limits
The official ATT&CK description is sparse: CrossRAT is identified as a cross-platform RAT, with relationships to Dark Caracal and five techniques. The most defensible Glexia value is to treat it as a cross-platform coverage and response-readiness test case rather than to make claims about prevalence, current exploitation, or guaranteed detections.
ATT&CK supplies no official detection text, aliases, labels, or tactics directly on the malware object. Local decisions require environment-specific telemetry, endpoint baselines, approved administrative tools, and confirmation of which operating systems are in scope.
CrossRAT
CrossRAT is a cross platform RAT.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture | CrossRAT is capable of taking screen captures.CitationLookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1543.001 | Launch Agent Sub-technique | CrossRAT creates a Launch Agent on macOS.CitationLookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | CrossRAT can list all files on a system.CitationLookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Sub-technique | CrossRAT uses run keys for persistence on Windows.CitationLookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1547.013 | XDG Autostart Entries Sub-technique | CrossRAT can use an XDG Autostart to establish persistence.CitationRed Canary Netwire Linux 2022 |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0070: Dark Caracal
Dark Caracal is threat group that has been attributed to the Lebanese General Directorate of General Security (GDGS) and has operated since at least 2012. [1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Current bundle | cd9f1f0eebda… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
CrossRAT
(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)
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[2]
Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018
Blaich, A., et al. (2018, January 18). Dark Caracal: Cyber-espionage at a Global Scale. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
Open source URL -
[3]
mitre-attack S0235Open source URL
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