S0178: Truvasys
Truvasys is first-stage malware that has been used by PROMETHIUM. It is a collection of modules written in the Delphi programming language. [1] [2] [3]
Analyst context for executives and security teams
Truvasys matters because ATT&CK describes it as Windows first-stage malware used by PROMETHIUM. Even with sparse ATT&CK detection guidance, its documented relationships point to practical defender questions: can the organization see suspicious Windows persistence through Run keys/startup folders, and can it distinguish legitimate tasks or services from masqueraded ones? For leaders, this is less about a single malware name and more about whether endpoint visibility and response playbooks can catch early-stage footholds before follow-on activity expands.
Executive priority
Prioritize validation of Windows endpoint persistence and service/task masquerading coverage. These controls support incident decision-making, audit evidence for endpoint monitoring, and resilience against first-stage malware behaviors. Security leaders should ask whether SOC teams collect the right Windows telemetry, whether detections are tuned for renamed or legitimate-looking services/tasks, and whether IR teams can quickly scope affected hosts if registry startup persistence is found.
Technical view
ATT&CK lists Truvasys as Windows malware with no standalone detection text, but relationships show use of T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service and T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder. SOC and IR teams should validate visibility into Windows autorun locations, startup folder changes, task/service names and descriptions, related process execution, and endpoint security detections tied to the Microsoft-referenced malware family. Because tactics are not specified on the malware object, detection engineering should anchor analytics to the related techniques rather than assuming a complete Truvasys behavior chain.
Likely telemetry
- Windows registry change events for Run keys and other startup-related autorun locations
- Startup folder file creation or modification events
- Windows service and scheduled task creation, modification, name, display name, and description metadata
- Process execution telemetry showing programs launched from startup persistence locations
- Endpoint protection or malware alert telemetry referencing Truvasys or related Microsoft detections
Detection direction
- Validate coverage for T1547.001 by monitoring new or modified Run key and startup folder entries, especially entries launching unusual paths or recently created binaries.
- Validate coverage for T1036.004 by comparing task and service names/descriptions against known-good baselines and looking for lookalike or misleading names.
- Tune detections to reduce false positives from legitimate software installers, updaters, and administrative tooling that commonly create startup entries or services.
- Use relationship context conservatively: PROMETHIUM is associated with Truvasys in ATT&CK, but local detections should not infer attribution from a single persistence artifact.
- Because official detection guidance is not provided, require environment-specific testing with known benign administrative activity and endpoint telemetry quality checks.
Mitigation priorities
- Harden and monitor Windows autorun locations, including registry Run keys and startup folders, with change control where practical.
- Restrict the ability of standard users and unmanaged software to create persistence mechanisms that execute at logon.
- Maintain endpoint protection coverage and ensure alerts from Microsoft-referenced malware detections flow into SOC triage workflows.
- Establish baselines for approved scheduled tasks, services, and startup entries so masquerading is easier to identify.
- Prepare IR procedures for rapid host isolation, autorun review, persistence removal, and scoping across similarly configured Windows systems.
Analyst notes and limits
The strongest defensive value comes from the two ATT&CK relationships: masqueraded tasks/services and Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder persistence. The malware object itself provides limited behavior detail beyond Windows platform, first-stage role, Delphi modules, and use by PROMETHIUM. Treat Truvasys as a prompt to validate early-stage Windows persistence visibility rather than as a complete detection specification.
ATT&CK provides no official detection text, no aliases, no labels, and no malware-level tactics for this object. The supplied relationship context is limited to PROMETHIUM use and two techniques. Any assessment of exposure, active exploitation, impact, or attribution requires local telemetry and additional intelligence not included in the supplied fields.
Truvasys
Truvasys is first-stage malware that has been used by PROMETHIUM. It is a collection of modules written in the Delphi programming language. [1] [2] [3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Sub-technique | Truvasys adds a Registry Run key to establish persistence.CitationMicrosoft Win Defender Truvasys Sep 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1036.004 | Masquerade Task or Service Sub-technique | To establish persistence, Truvasys adds a Registry Run key with a value "TaskMgr" in an attempt to masquerade as the legitimate Windows Task Manager.CitationMicrosoft Win Defender Truvasys Sep 2017 |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0056: PROMETHIUM
PROMETHIUM is an activity group focused on espionage that has been active since at least 2012. The group has conducted operations globally with a heavy emphasis on Turkish targets. PROMETHIUM has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called NEODYMIUM due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics.[1][2][3]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Current bundle | f1be6bf8200a… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
-
[1]
Microsoft Win Defender Truvasys Sep 2017
Microsoft. (2017, September 15). Backdoor:Win32/Truvasys.A!dha. Retrieved November 30, 2017.
Open source URL -
[2]
Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016
Microsoft. (2016, December 14). Twin zero-day attacks: PROMETHIUM and NEODYMIUM target individuals in Europe. Retrieved November 27, 2017.
Open source URL -
[3]
Microsoft SIR Vol 21
Anthe, C. et al. (2016, December 14). Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 21. Retrieved November 27, 2017.
Open source URL -
[4]
Truvasys
(Citation: Microsoft Win Defender Truvasys Sep 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21)
-
[5]
mitre-attack S0178Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.