S0177: Power Loader
Power Loader is modular code sold in the cybercrime market used as a downloader in malware families such as Carberp, Redyms and Gapz. [1] [2]
Analyst context for executives and security teams
Power Loader matters because ATT&CK describes it as modular downloader code sold in the cybercrime market and used in malware families including Carberp, Redyms, and Gapz. For leaders, the practical issue is not a single named malware sample; it is whether the organization can recognize downloader behavior and follow-on injection activity before additional malware is staged or hidden inside legitimate processes.
Executive priority
Treat this as a readiness check for malware triage, endpoint visibility, and incident escalation. Because the supplied relationship links Power Loader to Extra Window Memory Injection, security leaders should ask whether SOC and IR teams can investigate suspicious downloader activity together with Windows process-injection evidence, preserve host telemetry, and explain coverage to auditors or risk owners without relying only on malware names or signatures.
Technical view
ATT&CK provides no official detection text for Power Loader and no platform list on the malware object itself. The useful technical anchor is the relationship showing use of T1055.011, Extra Window Memory Injection, whose ATT&CK context is Windows and associated with stealth and privilege escalation. Detection engineering should therefore validate coverage for downloader execution patterns and, where Windows endpoints are in scope, process-injection indicators involving GUI/window-related process behavior, anomalous memory activity, and suspicious parent-child or module-loading relationships. IR playbooks should avoid treating downloader discovery as containment-complete; the key question is what payloads were retrieved or injected and which processes were affected.
Likely telemetry
- Endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry
- Endpoint module, memory, or injection-related telemetry where available
- Windows event and EDR telemetry from processes with GUI/window behavior when investigating T1055.011 context
- Network connection, DNS, proxy, and download telemetry associated with suspected downloader activity
- File creation, persistence-adjacent, and malware quarantine events from affected hosts
Detection direction
- Do not depend solely on the Power Loader name; ATT&CK describes modular downloader code and related families, so behavior-based validation is more durable than malware-family labeling alone.
- Validate whether endpoint tooling can surface suspicious injection behavior relevant to Extra Window Memory Injection on Windows systems, including activity hidden inside otherwise legitimate live processes.
- Correlate host execution evidence with outbound network/download activity to distinguish downloader staging from ordinary software update or administrative activity.
- Tune false positives around legitimate GUI applications and security tools that may interact with windows, memory, or processes; require corroborating indicators such as unusual lineage, unexpected network activity, or suspicious file writes.
- Because MITRE provides no official detection guidance for this malware object, document local analytic assumptions and test them against controlled telemetry rather than assuming ATT&CK coverage equals operational coverage.
Mitigation priorities
- Prioritize endpoint visibility and response controls capable of preserving process, memory, and network context for suspected downloader infections.
- Harden egress monitoring and investigate unusual downloads from endpoints, especially when paired with suspicious process behavior.
- Use application control, least privilege, and endpoint protection policies to reduce opportunities for untrusted downloader code to execute and inject into other processes.
- Ensure IR procedures require scoping for secondary payloads and injected processes before declaring eradication.
- Map any detections or controls to the related technique T1055.011 for coverage reporting, but keep evidence separate from unsupported claims about this specific malware object.
Analyst notes and limits
The supplied ATT&CK object is sparse: it identifies Power Loader as modular downloader code sold in the cybercrime market and cites public reporting from 2013. The strongest relationship-driven context is its use of Extra Window Memory Injection. This take therefore emphasizes defensive validation for downloader behavior and Windows injection telemetry rather than making claims about current prevalence, specific victims, or guaranteed detections.
Platforms and tactics are not specified on the Power Loader malware object, and official detection is not provided. Windows, stealth, and privilege-escalation context comes only from the related T1055.011 technique. Local environment telemetry, EDR capability, and incident evidence are required to assess actual exposure or coverage.
Power Loader
Power Loader is modular code sold in the cybercrime market used as a downloader in malware families such as Carberp, Redyms and Gapz. [1] [2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1055.011 | Extra Window Memory Injection Sub-technique | Power Loader overwrites Explorer’s Shell_TrayWnd extra window memory to redirect execution to a NTDLL function that is abused to assemble and execute a return-oriented programming (ROP) chain and create a malicious thread within Explorer.exe.CitationMalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013CitationWeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013 |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 1f9287c51e41… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013
MalwareTech. (2013, August 13). PowerLoader Injection – Something truly amazing. Retrieved December 16, 2017.
Open source URL -
[2]
WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013
Matrosov, A. (2013, March 19). Gapz and Redyms droppers based on Power Loader code. Retrieved December 16, 2017.
Open source URL -
[3]
mitre-attack S0177Open source URL
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