CWE-203: Observable Discrepancy | Glexia

Causes

• The following code checks validity of the supplied username and password and notifies the user of a successful or failed login. In the above code, there are different messages for when an incorrect username is supplied, versus when the username is correct but the password is wrong. This difference enables a potential attacker to understand the state of the login function, and could allow an attacker to discover a valid username by trying different values until the incorrect password message is returned. In essence, this makes it easier for an attacker to obtain half of the necessary authentication credentials.,While this type of information may be helpful to a user, it is also useful to a potential attacker. In the above example, the message for both failed cases should be the same, such as:
• In this example, the attacker observes how long an authentication takes when the user types in the correct password. When the attacker tries their own values, they can first try strings of various length. When they find a string of the right length, the computation will take a bit longer, because the for loop will run at least once. Additionally, with this code, the attacker can possibly learn one character of the password at a time, because when they guess the first character right, the computation will take longer than a wrong guesses. Such an attack can break even the most sophisticated password with a few hundred guesses.,Note that in this example, the actual password must be handled in constant time as far as the attacker is concerned, even if the actual password is of an unusual length. This is one reason why it is good to use an algorithm that, among other things, stores a seeded cryptographic one-way hash of the password, then compare the hashes, which will always be of the same length.
• Non-uniform processing time causes timing channel. In the example above, an attacker may vary the inputs, then observe differences between processing times (since different plaintexts take different time). This could be used to infer information about the key.
• Suppose memory access patterns for an encryption routine are dependent on the secret key. An attacker can recover the key by knowing if specific memory locations have been accessed or not. The value stored at those memory locations is irrelevant. The encryption routine's memory accesses will affect the state of the processor cache. If cache resources are shared across contexts, after the encryption routine completes, an attacker in different execution context can discover which memory locations the routine accessed by measuring the time it takes for their own memory accesses to complete.

Remediation

• Architecture and Design:
• Implementation:

Detection

• Code review
• SAST
• DAST
• Focused regression tests

Related CWEs

• CWE-1300: Improper Protection of Physical Side Channels
• CWE-1300: Improper Protection of Physical Side Channels
• CWE-1303: Non-Transparent Sharing of Microarchitectural Resources
• CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
• CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
• CWE-204: Observable Response Discrepancy
• CWE-205: Observable Behavioral Discrepancy
• CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy

Related CVEs

Related CVE mappings appear after CVE records are cross-indexed.

ATT&CK Relevance

ATT&CK relevance is shown only when reviewed or responsibly inferred.