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CWE Reference

CWE-1270: Generation of Incorrect Security Tokens | Glexia

CWE-1270 (Generation of Incorrect Security Tokens) weakness overview with consequences, detection methods, mitigations, related CVEs and MITRE ATT&CK context.

Release 4.20weaknessIncomplete

Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

CWE-1270: Generation of Incorrect Security Tokens

Generation of Incorrect Security Tokens represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.

Executive Impact

  • Confidentiality Integrity Availability Access Control: Modify Files or Directories Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands Bypass Protection Mechanism Gain Privileges or Assume Identity Read Memory Modify Memory DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart: Incorrectly generated Security Tokens could result in the same token used for multiple agents or multiple tokens being used for the same agent. This condition could result in a Denial-of-Service (DoS) or the execution of an action that in turn could result in privilege escalation or unintended access.

Developer Pattern

CWE-1270 is the kind of defect developers can usually prevent with explicit validation, safer framework defaults, and tests that exercise hostile input or unsafe state transitions.

Automation confidence

high confidence from CWE-1270, 4.20.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official CWE Definition

CWE-1270: Generation of Incorrect Security Tokens

The product implements a Security Token mechanism to differentiate what actions are allowed or disallowed when a transaction originates from an entity. However, the Security Tokens generated in the system are incorrect.

Systems-On-a-Chip (SoC) (Integrated circuits and hardware engines) implement Security Tokens to differentiate and identify actions originated from various agents. These actions could be "read", "write", "program", "reset", "fetch", "compute", etc. Security Tokens are generated and assigned to every agent on the SoC that is either capable of generating an action or receiving an action from another agent. Every agent could be assigned a unique, Security Token based on its trust level or privileges.

Type
weakness
Abstraction
Base
Status
Incomplete
Source
MITRE CWE definition

Developer And Remediation Guidance

How teams prevent and detect this weakness

Causes

  • Consider a system with a register for storing an AES key for encryption or decryption. The key is 128 bits long implemented as a set of four 32-bit registers. The key registers are assets, and register, AES_KEY_ACCESS_POLICY, is defined to provide necessary access controls. The access-policy register defines which agents, using a Security Token, may access the AES-key registers. Each bit in this 32-bit register is used to define a Security Token. There could be a maximum of 32 Security Tokens that are allowed access to the AES-key registers. When set (bit = "1") bit number allows action from an agent whose identity matches that bit number. If Clear (bit = "0") the action is disallowed for the corresponding agent. Assume the system has two agents: a Main-controller and an Aux-controller. The respective Security Tokens are "1" and "2". Register Description Default AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_0 AES key [0:31] for encryption or decryption 0x00000000 AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_1 AES key [32:63] for encryption or decryption 0x00000000 AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_2 AES key [64:95] for encryption or decryption 0x00000000 AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_3 AES key [96:127] for encryption or decryption 0x00000000 AES_KEY_ACCESS_POLICY AES key access register [31:0] 0x00000002 An agent with a Security Token "1" has access to AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_0 through AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_3 registers. As per the above access policy, the AES-Key-access policy allows access to the AES-key registers if the security Token is "1". Both agents have access to the AES-key registers.

Remediation

  • Architecture and Design Implementation: Generation of Security Tokens should be reviewed for design inconsistency and common weaknesses. Security-Token definition and programming flow should be tested in pre-silicon and post-silicon testing.

Detection

  • Code review
  • SAST
  • DAST
  • Focused regression tests

Mappings

Related CVEs, CWEs, and ATT&CK context

Related CWEs

Related CVEs

Related CVE mappings appear after CVE records are cross-indexed.

Open CWE CVE mapping

ATT&CK Relevance

ATT&CK relevance is shown only when reviewed or responsibly inferred.