CWE-1283: Mutable Attestation or Measurement Reporting Data | Glexia
CWE-1283 (Mutable Attestation or Measurement Reporting Data) weakness overview with consequences, detection methods, mitigations, related CVEs and MITRE ATT&CK…
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis
CWE-1283: Mutable Attestation or Measurement Reporting Data
Mutable Attestation or Measurement Reporting Data represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.
Executive Impact
- Confidentiality: Read Memory Read Application Data
Developer Pattern
CWE-1283 is the kind of defect developers can usually prevent with explicit validation, safer framework defaults, and tests that exercise hostile input or unsafe state transitions.
Automation confidence
high confidence from CWE-1283, 4.20.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Official CWE Definition
CWE-1283: Mutable Attestation or Measurement Reporting Data
The register contents used for attestation or measurement reporting data to verify boot flow are modifiable by an adversary.
A System-on-Chip (SoC) implements secure boot or verified boot. During this boot flow, the SoC often measures the code that it authenticates. The measurement is usually done by calculating the one-way hash of the code binary and extending it to the previous hash. The hashing algorithm should be a Secure One-Way hash function. The final hash, i.e., the value obtained after the completion of the boot flow, serves as the measurement data used in reporting or in attestation. The calculated hash is often stored in registers that can later be read by the party of interest to determine tampering of the boot flow. A common weakness is that the contents in these registers are modifiable by an adversary, thus spoofing the measurement.
Developer And Remediation Guidance
How teams prevent and detect this weakness
Causes
- The SoC extends the hash and stores the results in registers. Without protection, an adversary can write their chosen hash values to these registers. Thus, the attacker controls the reported results. To prevent the above scenario, the registers should have one or more of the following properties: Should be Read-Only with respect to an adversary Cannot be extended or modifiable either directly or indirectly (using a trusted agent as proxy) by an adversary Should have appropriate access controls or protections
Remediation
- Architecture and Design: Measurement data should be stored in registers that are read-only or otherwise have access controls that prevent modification by an untrusted agent.
Detection
- Code review
- SAST
- DAST
- Focused regression tests
Mappings
Related CVEs, CWEs, and ATT&CK context
Related CWEs
ATT&CK Relevance
ATT&CK relevance is shown only when reviewed or responsibly inferred.