A flaw was found in Keycloak. When a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) encrypted request object is submitted, Keycloak may incorrectly process unsigned claims if the decrypted content is raw JSON, bypassing the configured signature policy. This allows a remote attacker to submit unauthorized claims, leading to a compromise of data integrity within the OpenID Connect (OIDC) authorization flow. While a redirect URI allowlist acts as a compensating control, this vulnerability violates OIDC Core and Financial-grade API (FAPI) signing requirements.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
Keycloak may trust attacker-supplied identity claims that should have required a valid signature. In affected OpenID Connect flows, this can let a remote, unauthenticated attacker alter authorization data. The primary risk is compromised integrity, not confidentiality or availability. A strict redirect URI allowlist reduces exposure but does not correct the policy bypass.
Executive priority
Schedule prompt remediation for affected identity infrastructure, especially regulated FAPI deployments or externally accessible authorization services. Although rated medium and requiring high complexity, successful abuse could undermine authorization decisions. Treat the redirect allowlist only as temporary risk reduction and confirm package-level remediation through the relevant Red Hat advisory.
Technical view
JWE request-object handling may accept decrypted raw JSON as unsigned claims despite a configured signature requirement. This CWE-347 flaw violates OIDC Core and FAPI signing expectations. CVSS 3.1 is 5.9: network-accessible, unauthenticated, high complexity, with high integrity impact and no stated confidentiality or availability impact.
Likely exposure
Exposure requires an affected Red Hat build of Keycloak and OIDC clients accepting JWE-encrypted request objects under a signature policy. Listed affected packages span Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.4 and 26.6. Package-specific versions differ, so verify installed RPM and operator bundle versions against each applicable Red Hat erratum.
Exploitation context
The flaw is remotely reachable without privileges or user interaction, but exploitation complexity is rated high. The supplied record is not in CISA KEV, and the sources provide no evidence of active exploitation or public weaponization. Impact depends on successfully injecting unauthorized claims into a vulnerable authorization flow.
Researcher notes
The critical distinction is between encrypted content and authenticated content: JWE decryption alone does not satisfy a required signature policy. Testing should focus on policy enforcement after decryption without developing offensive payloads. The source bundle lists package-specific affected states and unaffected product releases; consult the matching RHSA for authoritative upgrade boundaries.
Mitigation direction
Apply the corrected Red Hat packages identified by the erratum matching your installed Keycloak package and release.
Maintain strict redirect URI allowlists as a compensating control, not as a substitute for updating.
Review vendor guidance before changing OIDC request-object or signature-policy settings.
Prioritize internet-facing identity services and deployments supporting JWE-encrypted request objects.
Validation and detection
Inventory Keycloak server, operator, and operator-bundle package versions separately.
Compare installed package versions with the affected and corrected builds in the applicable Red Hat erratum.
Confirm whether clients submit JWE-encrypted request objects and require signed request claims.
Verify redirect URI allowlists contain only explicitly approved destinations.
After updating, confirm unsigned decrypted JSON claims are rejected when signature policy requires signing.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
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cwe · low confidence lookup
CWE-347: Exact CWE lookup
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CWE-347 · source CWE mapping
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.