CVE-2026-86304: MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor
MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor.
parse_assertion in MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2 calls Net::SAML2::Binding::POST->new with no cacert, cert_text or anchors argument, then passes the returned XML to Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion->new_from_xml with the IdP signing certificate as cacert. In Net::SAML2 before 0.86 that certificate guards only encrypted assertions, so the signature on an unencrypted assertion is checked against the certificate the response itself carries.
An attacker starts a SAML login, then posts a response signed with a certificate of their own. The audience, InResponseTo and timestamp checks that follow are all satisfiable by the attacker, so the response authenticates any NameID it carries.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
Affected Perl applications can accept a forged SAML login signed with an attacker-controlled certificate. This could let an unauthenticated attacker impersonate any user identifier accepted by the application, potentially including privileged accounts. The issue affects MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 when using its SAML authentication path.
Executive priority
Treat as an immediate identity-security priority for affected SAML applications. A successful bypass could provide direct account impersonation without credentials or user action. Rapidly identify exposed deployments, upgrade them, and investigate suspicious SAML authentications. Systems not using this package or its SAML flow are not shown by the supplied evidence to be affected.
Technical view
MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2 creates Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trusted CA certificate, certificate text, or anchors. With Net::SAML2 before 0.86, unencrypted assertion signatures can consequently be validated against a certificate supplied within the response. Subsequent audience, request-correlation, and timestamp checks do not prevent the described authentication bypass.
Likely exposure
Exposure requires MojoX::Authentication before 0.006 and use of the affected SAML login flow. Internet-accessible SAML endpoints present the clearest risk. The supplied affected-product metadata is limited and internally unusual, so organizations should verify package versions and actual SAML usage rather than relying only on asset scanner matches.
Exploitation context
The described attack is remote, requires no prior privileges or user interaction, and can authenticate an attacker-selected NameID. The bundle reports a CVSS 3.1 score of 9.8. However, the CVE is not listed as KEV, and the provided sources do not establish active exploitation or public weaponization.
Researcher notes
The decisive condition is trust establishment for unencrypted assertion signatures, not merely presence of an IdP certificate later in assertion parsing. Confirm the installed MojoX::Authentication and Net::SAML2 versions, the assertion encryption mode, and the effective certificate-validation path. The bundle links CVE-2026-18089 as related, but does not explain that relationship sufficiently to extend affected-product conclusions.
Mitigation direction
Upgrade MojoX::Authentication to version 0.006 or later.
Review the 0.006 release notes and applicable vendor guidance before deployment.
Prioritize systems exposing the affected SAML login flow to untrusted networks.
Restrict access to affected SAML endpoints until remediation if business operations permit.
Validation and detection
Inventory Perl applications using MojoX::Authentication and record their installed versions.
Confirm whether each application enables MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2.
Verify affected systems have upgraded to MojoX::Authentication 0.006 or later.
In authorized staging, confirm assertions signed by untrusted certificates are rejected.
Review SAML authentication records for unexpected identities or unfamiliar signing certificates.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
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ATT&CK lookup starting points
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cwe · low confidence lookup
CWE-347: Exact CWE lookup
Use the exact CWE identifier as the starting point before reviewing related ATT&CK behavior. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
The CVE wording references authentication or credential exposure, so valid-account and credential-access review may help. This is a Glexia inferred lookup path, not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, or CVE Program mapping.
These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.
1CVSS vectors
4Timeline events
1ADP providers
4Source links
SSVC decision data
CISA-ADPCISA Coordinator
Timestamp
Version
2.0.3
Exploitation: noneAutomatable: yesTechnical Impact: total
CVSS vector scores
1 official score
We collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.
CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.
CWE-347 · source CWE mapping
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.