CVE-2026-86219: Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step
Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step.
server_start generates a fresh nonce and sends it in the challenge, and nothing later compares that value against the nonce the client returns. server_step derives the expected digest from the client's own parameters, so a response verifies whenever its digest matches the nonce it carries. The count table it also checks is keyed on the client-supplied nonce and starts empty in each new server object, so a captured first response, carrying `nc=00000001`, passes that too. RFC 2831 defines the nonce in the response as the value the server sent in the preceding challenge.
An attacker who observes one successful `qop=auth` exchange can replay the captured response against a later session for the same service, host, realm and user, and authenticate as that user without knowing the password.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
Affected Perl services may accept a previously captured DIGEST-MD5 login response in a new session. An attacker able to observe one successful exchange could impersonate that user without knowing the password, potentially gaining the user’s access and affecting sensitive systems or data.
Executive priority
Treat as an urgent authentication-control issue where vulnerable server-side DIGEST-MD5 is enabled. Rapidly identify exposed services and privileged identities, then upgrade or disable the mechanism. Lower priority only after confirming the package is absent, updated, or not used in the affected server configuration.
Technical view
Before Authen::SASL 2.2100, DIGEST_MD5 server_step does not verify that the client-returned nonce matches the server’s challenge. Digest and nonce-count checks rely on client-supplied state, allowing a captured first qop=auth response to authenticate in a later matching service, host, realm, and user context.
Likely exposure
Exposure is limited to applications using vulnerable Authen::SASL versions as a server with DIGEST-MD5 and qop=auth. Risk requires an attacker to observe a valid exchange and later reach a compatible authentication endpoint. The bundle does not identify specific downstream applications or deployment prevalence.
Exploitation context
The supplied sources describe a network-replay authentication bypass with low complexity, no privileges, and no user interaction after capture. Successful replay requires matching service, host, realm, and user parameters. CISA KEV status is false, and the supplied evidence does not establish active exploitation.
Researcher notes
The defect violates RFC 2831’s requirement that the response nonce equal the preceding server challenge. Because verification derives the expected digest from client-provided parameters and nonce-count state is keyed by that nonce in a fresh server object, cross-session replay can succeed. The cited patch and 2.2100 release notes provide remediation evidence.
Mitigation direction
Upgrade Authen::SASL to version 2.2100 or later.
Confirm deployed applications load the updated module, not an older bundled copy.
Review vendor guidance for applications that embed or constrain Authen::SASL versions.
Consider disabling DIGEST-MD5 server authentication until upgrading where operationally feasible.
Prioritize systems protecting privileged accounts or sensitive services.
Validation and detection
Inventory installed and application-bundled Authen::SASL versions.
Identify server-side DIGEST-MD5 configurations using qop=auth.
Verify the runtime-loaded module version is 2.2100 or later.
Confirm authentication services restarted or redeployed after updating.
Use a controlled regression test to confirm prior-session responses are rejected.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
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ATT&CK lookup starting points
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cwe · low confidence lookup
CWE-294: Exact CWE lookup
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The CVE wording references authentication or credential exposure, so valid-account and credential-access review may help. This is a Glexia inferred lookup path, not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, or CVE Program mapping.
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1CVSS vectors
3Timeline events
1ADP providers
6Source links
SSVC decision data
CISA-ADPCISA Coordinator
Timestamp
Version
2.0.3
Exploitation: noneAutomatable: yesTechnical Impact: total
CVSS vector scores
1 official score
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CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.
CWE-294 · source CWE mapping
Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay
Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.