CVE-2026-8450: HTTP::Daemon versions before 6.17 for Perl allow OS command injection via send_file()
HTTP::Daemon versions before 6.17 for Perl allow OS command injection via send_file().
send_file() opens its string argument with Perl's 2-arg open(). The 2-arg form interprets magic prefixes: '| cmd' and 'cmd |' open a pipe to a subprocess, '> path' and '>> path' open the path for write or append.
Untrusted input passed to send_file() can run OS commands at the daemon process UID. The read-pipe form ('cmd |') also leaks subprocess stdout into the HTTP response body. The write-mode forms can create or truncate files at attacker chosen paths.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
CVE-2026-8450 is a critical flaw in Perl HTTP::Daemon before 6.17. If an application passes attacker-controlled input to send_file(), the server can treat that input as an instruction to run commands or write files under the daemon account.
Executive priority
Treat as urgent for any internet-facing or semi-trusted Perl service using HTTP::Daemon. Prioritize inventory and patching because the vulnerability can cross from file-serving behavior into command execution.
Technical view
send_file() used Perl two-argument open(), which can interpret crafted string values as process pipes or write targets instead of filenames. Impact depends on whether untrusted input reaches send_file(), but successful abuse can execute OS commands or alter files as the daemon UID.
Likely exposure
Exposure is most likely in custom Perl services, test daemons, internal tools, or embedded HTTP handlers using HTTP::Daemon send_file() with request-controlled filenames or paths. Systems using patched package version 6.17 or vendor-fixed packages are the remediation target.
Exploitation context
The source bundle does not show CISA KEV listing or cited evidence of active exploitation. The issue is remotely reachable when affected HTTP::Daemon functionality is exposed and application logic passes untrusted values into send_file().
Researcher notes
The core condition is data flow into send_file(), not merely package presence. Validate application reachability, version, and whether user-controlled path strings can reach the vulnerable API. Avoid assuming exploit activity without new KEV or vendor evidence.
Mitigation direction
Upgrade HTTP::Daemon to 6.17 or a vendor-fixed package.
Apply relevant Debian or Red Hat advisories where distribution packages are used.
Audit send_file() callers and remove untrusted input paths.
Restrict served files to explicit allowlisted directories and filenames.
If immediate patching is blocked, follow vendor guidance and reduce exposure.
Validation and detection
Inventory Perl HTTP-Daemon package versions across applications and hosts.
Search code for HTTP::Daemon send_file() usage.
Confirm no request parameter can directly control send_file() input.
Verify patched version 6.17 or vendor-fixed builds are deployed.
Review vendor advisories for affected package names and fixed releases.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
These mappings and lookup hints may be relevant to the vulnerability behavior, CWE, affected product, or exposure path. Glexia-inferred context is not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, CWE, or CVE Program mapping.
ATT&CK lookup starting points
Use these exact CWE pages and searches to review the Glexia ATT&CK library from this CVE's weakness and description context.
cwe · medium confidence lookup
CWE-73: File access and web shell behavior lookup
File traversal and upload weaknesses can lead teams to review file, web shell, execution, and collection telemetry. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
Command injection weaknesses can lead defenders to review execution techniques and command interpreter telemetry. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
The CVE wording references code or command execution, so execution technique review may help defensive triage. This is a Glexia inferred lookup path, not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, or CVE Program mapping.
These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.
2CVSS vectors
7Timeline events
3ADP providers
11Source links
SSVC decision data
CISA-ADPCISA Coordinator
Timestamp
Version
2.0.3
Exploitation: noneAutomatable: yesTechnical Impact: total
CVSS vector scores
2 official scores
We collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.