CVE-2026-78619: Punk::Plugin::TOTP versions before 0.05 for Perl accept another account's recovery code at the two-factor challenge because totp_use_recovery compares user identifiers numerically
Punk::Plugin::TOTP versions before 0.05 for Perl accept another account's recovery code at the two-factor challenge because totp_use_recovery compares user identifiers numerically.
The helper searches the recovery model for the submitted code's digest alone, across every user's rows, so the ownership test that follows is the only thing binding a code to the account it was issued to. That test compares the row's user_id with the challenged user's id through Perl's integer coercion, and an identifier with no leading digits coerces to zero, so any two of them compare equal. User models keyed on a username, an email address or a UUID hit that case, and a numeric key compares as intended.
The challenge route feeds a submitted value to the helper once TOTP verification fails, so an attacker who knows a victim's password and holds a recovery code of their own passes the victim's second factor.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
A flaw in Punk::Plugin::TOTP before version 0.05 can let someone who already knows a victim’s password bypass the victim’s two-factor challenge using the attacker’s own recovery code. Applications using usernames, email addresses, or UUIDs as user identifiers are specifically exposed. This could enable account takeover despite TOTP protection.
Executive priority
Treat as an immediate remediation priority where affected versions, nonnumeric identifiers, and recovery codes coincide. The flaw undermines a primary account-takeover control once a password is compromised. Rapidly inventory deployments, upgrade exposed systems, rotate recovery codes, and investigate suspicious recovery-based logins.
Technical view
The recovery-code lookup searches globally by code digest, then relies on a numeric user-ID comparison for ownership. Perl coerces identifiers without leading digits to zero, causing unrelated nonnumeric identifiers to compare equal. The affected challenge path invokes recovery validation after TOTP failure. Numeric user identifiers compare as intended and are not described as affected by this specific flaw.
Likely exposure
Exposure is limited to Perl applications using Punk::Plugin::TOTP before 0.05 with recovery codes and nonnumeric user identifiers. Exploitation also requires the victim’s valid password and a recovery code belonging to another account. Deployments using numeric account keys are not described as vulnerable to this comparison failure.
Exploitation context
The supplied sources do not report active exploitation, and the CVE is not listed as KEV in the bundle. The attack is remotely reachable through the authentication flow, requires no victim interaction, and can defeat the second factor after password compromise. Evidence of real-world weaponization is incomplete.
Researcher notes
The security boundary depends on the ownership check because lookup begins with the submitted recovery-code digest across all users. The failure is identifier-type dependent: leading-nonnumeric values coerce to zero under integer comparison. The provided evidence supports the vulnerable logic and a 0.05 release boundary, but does not establish exploitation in the wild.
Mitigation direction
Upgrade Punk::Plugin::TOTP to version 0.05 or later.
Prioritize systems using usernames, email addresses, or UUIDs as account identifiers.
Temporarily restrict or disable recovery-code authentication if upgrading cannot occur promptly.
Invalidate existing recovery codes after remediation and issue replacements through a verified process.
Review vendor release notes and guidance before production deployment.
Validation and detection
Inventory applications and confirm the installed Punk::Plugin::TOTP version.
Identify whether user records use numeric or nonnumeric identifiers.
Confirm whether recovery-code authentication is enabled and externally reachable.
Verify recovery-code ownership is bound to the challenged account without numeric coercion.
Review authentication logs for unusual recovery-code use across different accounts.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
These mappings and lookup hints may be relevant to the vulnerability behavior, CWE, affected product, or exposure path. Glexia-inferred context is not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, CWE, or CVE Program mapping.
ATT&CK lookup starting points
Use these exact CWE pages and searches to review the Glexia ATT&CK library from this CVE's weakness and description context.
cwe · low confidence lookup
CWE-1025: Exact CWE lookup
Use the exact CWE identifier as the starting point before reviewing related ATT&CK behavior. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
Use the exact CWE identifier as the starting point before reviewing related ATT&CK behavior. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
The CVE wording references authentication or credential exposure, so valid-account and credential-access review may help. This is a Glexia inferred lookup path, not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, or CVE Program mapping.
These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.
1CVSS vectors
3Timeline events
2ADP providers
4Source links
SSVC decision data
CISA-ADPCISA Coordinator
Timestamp
Version
2.0.3
Exploitation: noneAutomatable: yesTechnical Impact: total
CVSS vector scores
1 official score
We collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.
CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.
CWE-1025 · source CWE mapping
Comparison Using Wrong Factors
Comparison Using Wrong Factors represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.
Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.