CVE-2026-77998: Joomla Extension - miniorange.com - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass via SAMLResponse Parameter in miniOrange SAML SSO < 11.0.2, SAML SP Single Sign On – Login with ADFS < 6.4, SAML SP Single Sign On – SAML SSO login with Google Apps < 6.4
Joomla Extension - miniorange.com - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass via SAMLResponse Parameter in miniOrange SAML SSO < 11.0.2, SAML SP Single Sign On – Login with ADFS < 6.4, SAML SP Single Sign On – SAML SSO login with Google Apps < 6.4 - This is due to the mo_saml_validate_signature() function performing a loose boolean check on the raw tri-state integer returned by PHP's openssl_verify(), causing an error return value of -1 to be evaluated as truthy and therefore treated as a successful signature verification. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any existing Joomla user, including administrators, by submitting a crafted SAMLResponse containing an attacker-controlled NameID and a deliberately malformed signature value that triggers an OpenSSL processing error — bypassing verification entirely and resulting in wp_set_auth_cookie() being called for the targeted account.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
A remote, unauthenticated attacker may be able to impersonate any existing Joomla user, including an administrator, through vulnerable miniOrange SAML SSO extensions. Successful abuse could expose site data, permit administrative changes, and disrupt services. The supplied record rates this CVSS 10.0, but contains product-detail inconsistencies that require vendor confirmation.
Executive priority
Treat internet-accessible affected installations as an emergency remediation item. Prioritize administrator-capable sites and systems protecting sensitive data. Because the supplied record alleges complete authentication bypass with maximum impact, rapidly inventory, contain, and upgrade; also require vendor confirmation where the bundle does not identify a fixed paid-edition version.
Technical view
The affected signature-validation function loosely evaluates PHP openssl_verify() results. Its -1 error state may be treated as true, allowing malformed SAML signatures to pass validation. An attacker-controlled NameID could then select an existing account. The description unexpectedly references wp_set_auth_cookie(), a WordPress function, despite identifying Joomla extensions; confirm implementation details with miniOrange.
Likely exposure
Exposure is highest where listed miniOrange Joomla SAML extensions are enabled and their SSO endpoint is internet-accessible. Supplied affected ranges cover Free through 11.0.1; Basic through 13.1.0; Standard through 24.1.0; Premium through 34.1.0; Enterprise through 44.1.0; and both named ADFS and Google Apps extensions through 6.3.0.
Exploitation context
The stated attack is remote, low-complexity, unauthenticated, and requires no user interaction. The source bundle marks KEV false and provides no cited evidence of active exploitation. It describes crafted SAML input causing signature-processing errors, but public exploit availability and real-world targeting are not established by the supplied sources.
Researcher notes
The core issue is improper handling of openssl_verify()'s tri-state return value, specifically confusing -1 with successful verification. The record labels CWE-639, although the described root cause more directly concerns signature-verification result handling. Joomla identification conflicts with the WordPress-specific wp_set_auth_cookie() reference. These discrepancies reduce confidence in implementation-level details, not the stated urgency.
Mitigation direction
Inventory Joomla sites for the listed miniOrange extensions and record installed versions.
Upgrade Free to 11.0.2 or later, and the named ADFS and Google Apps extensions to 6.4 or later.
For Basic, Standard, Premium, and Enterprise editions, obtain fixed-version guidance directly from miniOrange.
If remediation is unavailable, disable the affected SSO extension or restrict its endpoint until vendor guidance is confirmed.
Review administrator accounts, active sessions, and SSO activity for unauthorized access before restoring normal service.
Validation and detection
Confirm each installed extension name, edition, and version against every supplied affected range.
Verify upgraded versions are outside the affected range and match current miniOrange guidance.
Confirm malformed or unverifiable SAML assertions are rejected without creating an authenticated session.
Review SSO and Joomla logs for unexpected NameIDs, signature errors, account access, or administrator sessions.
Revoke suspicious sessions and validate the integrity of privileged accounts and configuration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
These mappings and lookup hints may be relevant to the vulnerability behavior, CWE, affected product, or exposure path. Glexia-inferred context is not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, CWE, or CVE Program mapping.
ATT&CK lookup starting points
Use these exact CWE pages and searches to review the Glexia ATT&CK library from this CVE's weakness and description context.
cwe · low confidence lookup
CWE-639: Exact CWE lookup
Use the exact CWE identifier as the starting point before reviewing related ATT&CK behavior. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
The CVE wording references authentication or credential exposure, so valid-account and credential-access review may help. This is a Glexia inferred lookup path, not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, or CVE Program mapping.
These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.
1CVSS vectors
3Timeline events
1ADP providers
2Source links
SSVC decision data
CISA-ADPCISA Coordinator
Timestamp
Version
2.0.3
Exploitation: noneAutomatable: yesTechnical Impact: total
CVSS vector scores
1 official score
We collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.
CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.
CWE-639 · source CWE mapping
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.