CVE-2026-73420: NextAuth.js: Email normalizer validates the address before Unicode normalization, allowing a homoglyph @ bypass
NextAuth.js provides authentication for Next.js. Prior to @auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32, the defaultNormalizer used by the email and magic-link sign-in flow validates an address before applying Unicode normalization. An address can contain a Unicode character such as U+FF20 FULLWIDTH COMMERCIAL AT that is not ASCII at-sign but canonicalizes to an ASCII at-sign under NFKC or NFKD normalization. The address passes the normalizer's single-at-sign check, but a downstream sendVerificationRequest mail library or delivery service that normalizes the address can then see two at-sign separators and deliver the passwordless sign-in link to an attacker-controlled recipient. Applications are affected when the email provider uses the built-in normalizer rather than a custom normalizeIdentifier and the downstream sender applies Unicode normalization. An attacker who knows a victim's email address can request the misrouted magic link and sign in as the victim without victim interaction. This issue is fixed in @auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
A flaw can cause an email sign-in link intended for a known victim to be delivered to an attacker-controlled address. Successful abuse enables passwordless account takeover without victim interaction, but only under specific email-normalization conditions.
Executive priority
Treat affected passwordless authentication deployments as an urgent patching priority because successful exploitation can compromise accounts without victim action. First identify externally accessible applications meeting all disclosed prerequisites, then upgrade and verify production dependencies.
Technical view
The default email normalizer validates separators before Unicode normalization. A non-ASCII character can later normalize into an ASCII at-sign, causing a downstream mail system to interpret a different recipient. Fixes are available in @auth/core 0.41.3, next-auth 4.24.15, and 5.0.0-beta.32.
Likely exposure
Exposure requires an affected version, email or magic-link authentication, the built-in normalizer, and a downstream sender that applies Unicode normalization. Applications using a custom normalizeIdentifier or a sender without such normalization do not meet the disclosed conditions.
Exploitation context
A remote, unauthenticated attacker who knows a victim's email address may obtain a misrouted sign-in link and impersonate the victim. The attack requires a susceptible delivery path. The bundle marks KEV false, and the cited sources provide no evidence of active exploitation.
Researcher notes
This is a validation-before-canonicalization weakness classified as CWE-180. Risk depends on behavior across the authentication normalizer and downstream delivery system, so version checks alone establish potential exposure, not exploitability. Review the complete email-processing chain without testing against real users.
Mitigation direction
Upgrade @auth/core to 0.41.3 or later.
Upgrade next-auth 4.x to 4.24.15 or later.
Upgrade next-auth 5 beta deployments to beta.32 or later.
Confirm production lockfiles and deployed artifacts contain the fixed dependency versions.
Validation and detection
Inventory applications using NextAuth.js email or magic-link sign-in.
Identify whether each email provider uses the built-in normalizer or custom normalizeIdentifier.
Determine whether the downstream mail library or delivery service performs Unicode normalization.
Safely verify in non-production that ambiguous Unicode email addresses cannot redirect sign-in links.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
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ATT&CK lookup starting points
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cwe · low confidence lookup
CWE-180: Exact CWE lookup
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1CVSS vectors
3Timeline events
1ADP providers
7Source links
SSVC decision data
CISA-ADPCISA Coordinator
Timestamp
Version
2.0.3
Exploitation: noneAutomatable: yesTechnical Impact: total
CVSS vector scores
1 official score
We collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.
CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.
CWE-180 · source CWE mapping
Incorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before Canonicalize
Incorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before Canonicalize represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.