CVE-2026-72889: Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify
Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify.
verify resolves the signature method class from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message. signature_method is required on every request, so the algorithm used to check a signature is chosen by whoever sent it, and nothing lets the verifying party pin the method instead. When a message names HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA256, the key is derived from consumer_secret and token_secret rather than from the key the provider deployed.
A provider deployed on RSA-SHA1 holds only the consumer public key, and RFC 5849 does not use consumer_secret for that method, so the required parameter is filled with a placeholder. A client that names HMAC-SHA1 instead has its signature checked against that placeholder, so a guessable one is enough to forge requests for any consumer key and token.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
A remote, unauthenticated sender may make vulnerable Perl OAuth services verify requests using a sender-chosen algorithm. In certain RSA deployments, this can make a predictable placeholder secret sufficient for accepting forged requests. Successful abuse could expose or alter protected data and disrupt service, depending on the access granted through affected OAuth credentials.
Executive priority
Treat this as urgent for internet-accessible OAuth providers using Net::OAuth below 0.33, especially RSA-SHA1 configurations. Inventory immediately and expedite upgrading. Lower priority only after confirming the package is absent, unaffected verification paths are unused, or exposure is otherwise eliminated. The lack of cited active exploitation reduces evidence of current attacks, not the vulnerability's technical severity.
Technical view
Net::OAuth before 0.33 resolves the verification class from the incoming signature_method parameter without allowing the provider to pin the expected method. An RSA-SHA1 deployment can consequently process an HMAC method and derive its verification key from consumer_secret and token_secret. If the required consumer_secret is a predictable placeholder, signature verification can be bypassed. This maps to CWE-347 and CWE-757.
Likely exposure
Exposure exists where Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 verify OAuth 1.0 requests. Risk is greatest for network-accessible providers configured for RSA-SHA1 that use predictable placeholder consumer secrets. Systems without the package, running 0.33 or later, or not using its verification functionality are not indicated as affected by the supplied evidence.
Exploitation context
The CVSS 3.1 score is 9.8, reflecting remote, low-complexity exploitation without privileges or user interaction and potentially high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact. The CVE is not listed in KEV, and the supplied sources provide no evidence of active exploitation. Public exploitation status is therefore unknown.
Researcher notes
The flaw is algorithm confusion caused by trusting an incoming algorithm identifier, compounded by incompatible key assumptions between RFC 5849 RSA-SHA1 and HMAC methods. Exploitability depends on the deployed verification configuration and predictability of the placeholder consumer secret. The bundle establishes the pre-0.33 affected boundary but provides no deployment-prevalence or exploitation telemetry.
Mitigation direction
Upgrade Net::OAuth to version 0.33 or later, following the vendor advisory and release notes.
Identify OAuth verification services using older direct, vendored, bundled, or transitive Net::OAuth copies.
Prioritize RSA-SHA1 deployments using placeholder consumer secrets or accepting request-selected signature methods.
Until upgraded, restrict network reachability or suspend affected verification endpoints where operations permit.
Review authentication logs for unexpected signature-method changes and suspicious accepted requests.
Validation and detection
Confirm every deployed runtime uses Net::OAuth version 0.33 or later.
Verify the provider enforces its intended signature method during request verification.
Test that unapproved or mismatched signature methods are rejected.
Inspect dependency locks, deployment images, and vendored Perl libraries for pre-0.33 copies.
Run authentication and authorization regression tests after upgrading.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
These mappings and lookup hints may be relevant to the vulnerability behavior, CWE, affected product, or exposure path. Glexia-inferred context is not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, CWE, or CVE Program mapping.
ATT&CK lookup starting points
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cwe · low confidence lookup
CWE-347: Exact CWE lookup
Use the exact CWE identifier as the starting point before reviewing related ATT&CK behavior. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
Use the exact CWE identifier as the starting point before reviewing related ATT&CK behavior. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
The CVE wording references authentication or credential exposure, so valid-account and credential-access review may help. This is a Glexia inferred lookup path, not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, or CVE Program mapping.
These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.
1CVSS vectors
3Timeline events
2ADP providers
5Source links
SSVC decision data
CISA-ADPCISA Coordinator
Timestamp
Version
2.0.3
Exploitation: noneAutomatable: yesTechnical Impact: total
CVSS vector scores
1 official score
We collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.
CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.
CWE-347 · source CWE mapping
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.
Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation
Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.