CVE-2026-7163: Assisted-service: assisted-service: authenticated users can gain administrative access to openshift clusters via credential disclosure
A vulnerability in the assisted-service REST API, an optional Assisted Installer (assisted-service) component in the Multicluster Engine (MCE), allows an authenticated user with minimal namespace-scoped privileges to obtain administrative credentials for arbitrary clusters provisioned through the hub.
The credentials download endpoint (GET /v2/clusters/{cluster_id}/credentials, which returns the kubeadmin password) and the kubeconfig download endpoint are operational in AUTH_TYPE=local mode, the only authentication mode available in on-premises ACM/MCE hub deployments. The local authenticator unconditionally grants full administrative access to any request bearing a valid JWT, with no per-endpoint restrictions. A valid local JWT is embedded as a plaintext query parameter in InfraEnvStatus.ISODownloadURL and is readable by any user who has get rights on an InfraEnv object in their own namespace.
The affected components ship as part of Multicluster Engine (MCE). The Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management (ACM) deployments that include MCE are equally affected.
This issue does not affect the hosted SaaS offering (console.redhat.com), which uses a different authentication mode.
Successful exploitation gives the attacker the kubeadmin password and kubeconfig for any OpenShift cluster provisioned through the affected hub, granting unrestricted root-level administrative access to those spoke clusters.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
A minimally privileged user can extract administrator credentials for OpenShift clusters managed through an affected on-premises hub. Those credentials provide unrestricted control of the targeted spoke cluster. The hosted console.redhat.com service is not affected.
Executive priority
Prioritize affected administrative hubs promptly because one low-privilege account could expose root-level access across multiple managed clusters. Urgency is highest where many sensitive spoke clusters share a hub or InfraEnv read permission is broadly assigned.
Technical view
In local authentication mode, assisted-service accepts any valid JWT without endpoint-level authorization. A plaintext JWT embedded in InfraEnvStatus.ISODownloadURL can be read by namespace users with InfraEnv get permission, then accepted by credential and kubeconfig download endpoints for arbitrary hub-provisioned clusters.
Likely exposure
Exposure is limited to on-premises ACM/MCE deployments containing affected assisted-service packages and using AUTH_TYPE=local. Users able to read InfraEnv objects in any namespace may be positioned to access credentials for clusters provisioned through that hub.
Exploitation context
The attack requires an authenticated user with limited namespace permissions and access to the affected hub environment. Successful abuse discloses kubeadmin credentials or kubeconfig. The source bundle reports no CISA KEV listing and provides no evidence of active exploitation.
Researcher notes
The core weakness combines plaintext credential material in a readable URL with missing endpoint-level authorization in local mode. Scope changes because credentials from one namespace can reportedly target arbitrary hub-provisioned clusters. Exact fixed builds and credential-recovery procedures are not stated in the supplied narrative; consult the matched Red Hat errata.
Mitigation direction
Identify affected MCE and ACM installations and their assisted-service package versions.
Review and apply the applicable Red Hat security errata for each deployed MCE release.
Restrict InfraEnv read access to trusted users until remediation is complete.
Follow Red Hat guidance for replacing any potentially disclosed cluster credentials.
Review access to affected hubs and managed clusters for unauthorized activity.
Validation and detection
Confirm whether assisted-service is installed through MCE or ACM on each hub.
Verify whether the deployment uses AUTH_TYPE=local rather than the hosted SaaS authentication mode.
Inventory deployed package builds against the affected entries and applicable Red Hat errata.
Review RBAC assignments granting users permission to read InfraEnv objects.
Audit credential and kubeconfig download activity for unexpected users or cluster identifiers.
After updating, verify installed package builds match the applicable Red Hat advisory.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
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