CVE-2026-59706: mem0 - Unauthenticated Config API Exposure and SSRF via ollama_base_url
mem0 contains unauthenticated config API endpoints that expose LLM API keys in plaintext and allow server-side request forgery via attacker-controlled ollama_base_url parameter. Unauthenticated attackers can retrieve stored secrets like OpenAI API keys via GET /api/v1/config/ or trigger SSRF attacks by setting ollama_base_url to internal addresses like cloud IMDS via PUT /api/v1/config/mem0/llm endpoint.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
mem0, an open-source memory layer for AI applications, exposes configuration endpoints without any authentication. Anyone who can reach the server over the network can read stored LLM API keys (like OpenAI keys) in plaintext and can also redirect the service to internal cloud metadata addresses. That combination lets attackers steal paid API credentials and potentially reach sensitive cloud identity data.
Executive priority
Treat as urgent for any team running mem0. The bug lets an unauthenticated attacker steal LLM API keys (billing and data-access impact) and pivot toward cloud metadata. Prioritize patching, key rotation, and blocking public access this cycle; assign an owner today and confirm remediation within the standard critical-vulnerability SLA.
Technical view
The mem0 server exposes GET /api/v1/config/ and PUT /api/v1/config/mem0/llm without authentication (CWE-306). The GET endpoint returns stored provider secrets in plaintext, and the PUT endpoint accepts an attacker-controlled ollama_base_url used for outbound requests, enabling SSRF to internal addresses such as cloud IMDS (e.g., 169.254.169.254). CVSS 9.3 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N). A patch commit is referenced upstream.
Likely exposure
Any mem0 deployment whose HTTP API is reachable from untrusted networks, or from within a shared/lateral-movement-friendly environment. Cloud-hosted instances with attached instance metadata are especially exposed because SSRF can reach IMDS and adjacent internal services.
Exploitation context
Not listed in CISA KEV. The sources describe unauthenticated network-reachable endpoints and a public patch commit plus a VulnCheck advisory, indicating the issue is well-documented and trivially reproducible. No confirmed in-the-wild exploitation is cited in the provided bundle.
Researcher notes
Root cause is missing authentication (CWE-306) on config endpoints, compounded by unvalidated ollama_base_url enabling SSRF with scope change (S:C in the vector). Focus validation on the patch diff at commit a3154d5 to confirm both auth enforcement and URL/host allowlisting. The bundle lists mem0 versions as "0" with defaultStatus "unaffected", so treat the affected-version data as incomplete and rely on the upstream commit and VulnCheck advisory for fix boundaries.
Mitigation direction
Upgrade mem0 to a version that includes the referenced patch commit a3154d5.
Block external access to /api/v1/config/ paths at the ingress or reverse proxy.
Require authentication and network ACLs in front of any mem0 deployment.
Rotate any LLM/provider API keys that were stored in exposed mem0 instances.
On cloud hosts, enforce IMDSv2 and restrict egress from mem0 to only required LLM endpoints.
Consult mem0 project guidance for current fixed versions and configuration hardening.
Validation and detection
Inventory mem0 instances and confirm build includes patch commit a3154d5 or later.
From an unauthenticated client, verify GET /api/v1/config/ does not return secrets.
Confirm PUT /api/v1/config/mem0/llm requires auth and rejects non-allowlisted ollama_base_url values.
Review reverse proxy and WAF logs for hits on /api/v1/config/ endpoints.
Check cloud audit logs and IMDS access records for anomalous requests from mem0 hosts.
Verify rotated API keys are no longer accepted by upstream providers.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
These mappings and lookup hints may be relevant to the vulnerability behavior, CWE, affected product, or exposure path. Glexia-inferred context is not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, CWE, or CVE Program mapping.
ATT&CK lookup starting points
Use these exact CWE pages and searches to review the Glexia ATT&CK library from this CVE's weakness and description context.
cwe · medium confidence lookup
CWE-306: Credential and account abuse lookup
Authentication and credential weaknesses can make valid-account abuse and credential telemetry useful review starting points. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
The CVE wording references SSRF or metadata access, so cloud discovery and credential material review may help. This is a Glexia inferred lookup path, not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, or CVE Program mapping.
These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.
We collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.
CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.
CWE-306 · source CWE mapping
Missing Authentication for Critical Function
Missing Authentication for Critical Function represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.