CVE-2026-55736: Private action arguments can be set by user input in Ash
Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in ash-project ash allows a user to set the value of a private action argument that is intended to be controlled only by trusted server-side code.
Action arguments declared with public?: false are meant to be set internally (for example via Ash.Changeset.set_private_argument/3) and must not be settable from end-user input. When a changeset is built from a parameter map, Ash filters out private arguments, but the filtering is incomplete.
In the regular changeset path (for_create, for_update, for_destroy), private arguments are stripped only when the parameter key is an atom. When the key is a binary (string), as is the case for user-supplied parameters, the private argument is kept and the user controls its value. In the atomic path (Ash.Changeset.fully_atomic_changeset/4, also reached through atomic and bulk updates), private arguments are not stripped at all, regardless of whether the key is an atom or a binary.
An attacker who can submit parameters to an action that defines a private argument can therefore inject a value for that argument. Depending on how the application uses the argument (for example an acting_user_id driving authorization or record ownership), this can lead to an integrity violation or privilege escalation.
This issue affects ash: from 3.0.0 before 3.29.3.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
Ash applications may have exposed supposedly private action inputs to end users. If an application used those private arguments for ownership, identity, or authorization decisions, a user could alter behavior the server intended to control. The issue is fixed in Ash 3.29.3.
Executive priority
Treat as a targeted integrity risk, not a broad remote-code-execution emergency. Prioritize internet-facing or multi-tenant applications where Ash private arguments influence permissions or record ownership.
Technical view
In Ash 3.0.0 before 3.29.3, changeset construction incompletely filters action arguments marked public?: false. Binary parameter keys can bypass regular filtering, and fully atomic changesets do not strip private arguments. Impact depends on whether affected actions use private arguments for sensitive integrity decisions.
Likely exposure
Exposure is likely limited to Elixir applications using ash versions 3.0.0 through before 3.29.3 with actions defining private arguments and accepting user-controlled parameters.
Exploitation context
The bundle does not cite active exploitation, and KEV is false. Abuse requires reaching an affected action and supplying parameters that match private argument names. Practical impact is application-specific and can include integrity violations or privilege escalation.
Researcher notes
The strongest signal is the vendor advisory and patch commit. The description identifies two filtering gaps: binary keys in regular changesets and missing stripping in fully atomic changesets. Evidence does not establish exploitation in the wild.
Mitigation direction
Upgrade ash to version 3.29.3 or later.
Review actions using public?: false arguments for authorization, ownership, or identity logic.
Prioritize atomic and bulk update paths for review.
Follow the vendor advisory and patch guidance for remaining compensating controls.
Validation and detection
Inventory ash package versions in affected Elixir applications.
Search Ash resources for action arguments declared with public?: false.
Confirm user-facing routes cannot influence sensitive private arguments after upgrade.
Add regression tests for regular, atomic, and bulk changeset parameter handling.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
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The CVE wording references privilege impact, so privilege escalation and authorization behavior review may help. This is a Glexia inferred lookup path, not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, or CVE Program mapping.
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Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes
Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.