CVE-2026-54513: jackson-databind: Array subtype allowlist bypass in BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator (allowIfSubTypeIsArray)
jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.10.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.Builder.allowIfSubTypeIsArray() allowlists any array type based only on clazz.isArray(), without validating the array's component (element) type against the configured allowlist. A PTV built with allowIfSubTypeIsArray() plus an explicit concrete-type allowlist therefore still permits EvilType[] even though EvilType is not allowlisted. When Jackson deserializes the elements and no per-element type IDs are present, it instantiates the component type directly with no further PTV check, bypassing the allowlist. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
This is a high-severity flaw in Jackson Databind used by Java applications. A specific safety allowlist for polymorphic deserialization can be bypassed for array types, allowing an otherwise disallowed element class to be instantiated. Exposure depends on application configuration and untrusted input paths, not simply having Jackson present.
Executive priority
Prioritize remediation for internet-facing or partner-facing Java services that deserialize untrusted data. The issue has high impact potential, but exposure is configuration-specific and no active exploitation is cited in the provided sources.
Technical view
BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.Builder.allowIfSubTypeIsArray() accepts any array using clazz.isArray() without checking the component type against the configured allowlist. In affected versions, deserialization may instantiate a non-allowlisted array component type when elements lack per-element type IDs, bypassing intended subtype controls.
Likely exposure
Likely exposure is Java software using affected jackson-databind versions with polymorphic deserialization, BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator, allowIfSubTypeIsArray(), and externally controlled serialized input. Standard data binding without this validator pattern is not confirmed exposed by the provided sources.
Exploitation context
The CVSS vector is network-accessible with no privileges or user interaction, but high attack complexity. The source bundle does not identify active exploitation, and KEV status is false. Practical exploitability depends on reachable deserialization paths and available dangerous application classes.
Researcher notes
Focus triage on the combination of affected versions, polymorphic deserialization, allowIfSubTypeIsArray(), and explicit concrete-type allowlists. The bypass concerns array component validation, not a blanket vulnerability in every Jackson Databind deployment.
Mitigation direction
Upgrade jackson-databind to 2.18.8, 2.21.4, or 3.1.4 as applicable.
Check vendor advisories for backported fixes in packaged distributions.
Inventory direct and transitive jackson-databind dependencies across Java services.
Review use of BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.Builder.allowIfSubTypeIsArray().
Reduce or remove polymorphic deserialization of untrusted input where feasible.
Validation and detection
Confirm deployed jackson-databind versions are outside the affected ranges.
Search code for allowIfSubTypeIsArray and BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator usage.
Map endpoints, queues, or jobs that deserialize externally supplied data.
Verify dependency resolution after builds, including shaded or bundled libraries.
Track Red Hat or vendor package status where Jackson is supplied by the platform.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
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ATT&CK lookup starting points
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cwe · low confidence lookup
CWE-184: Exact CWE lookup
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2CVSS vectors
5Timeline events
2ADP providers
11Source links
SSVC decision data
CISA-ADPCISA Coordinator
Timestamp
Version
2.0.3
Exploitation: noneAutomatable: noTechnical Impact: total
CVSS vector scores
2 official scores
We collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.
CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.
CWE-184 · source CWE mapping
Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.