CVE-2026-53424: Missing one-time-use enforcement in Samly allows replay of SAML bearer assertions
Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.
Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.
This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
Samly does not ensure that a SAML login assertion is used only once. Anyone who captures a valid assertion may reuse it until it expires, repeatedly creating sessions as that user. Captured assertions may come from network traffic, browser history, or logs, making privileged-account exposure especially serious.
Executive priority
Treat as an urgent identity-security issue wherever Samly protects sensitive or privileged access. Prioritize exposure inventory, removal of assertion material from logs, and monitoring for replay while awaiting or applying authoritative project remediation.
Technical view
Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector performs no check. Samly does not expose esaml’s duplicate-detection callback, leaving SAML bearer assertions replayable until NotOnOrAfter. The bundle describes Samly 0.3.0 onward as affected, although its structured version entries contain conflicting default-status data.
Likely exposure
Applications using Dropbox Samly 0.3.0 or later for SAML Web Browser SSO may be exposed. Practical compromise requires access to a still-valid SAMLResponse, so environments that log assertions, expose browser artifacts, or inadequately protect authentication traffic face greater risk.
Exploitation context
The CVSS 4.0 score is 9.1, reflecting remote, low-complexity authentication bypass after an assertion is captured. The bundle does not report CISA KEV inclusion or provide evidence of active exploitation. Replay remains limited by the assertion’s NotOnOrAfter timestamp.
Researcher notes
The core weakness is CWE-294 capture-replay caused by absent duplicate detection, not signature forgery. Identical assertion bytes can establish multiple sessions during their validity window. The supplied affected-version structures conflict with the narrative statement, and no fixed version or confirmed vendor mitigation appears in the bundle.
Mitigation direction
Check Samly and ERLEF guidance for an official fixed release or supported duplicate-detection configuration.
Upgrade promptly when the project identifies a corrected version.
Prevent SAMLResponse values from entering application, proxy, tracing, or analytics logs.
Restrict access to existing logs and browser artifacts that may contain assertions.
Consider shorter assertion lifetimes as a temporary control; this does not prevent replay.
Validation and detection
Inventory applications and dependency locks for Samly versions from 0.3.0 onward.
Confirm whether authentication reaches Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 and esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2.
Review logging and tracing configurations for storage of SAMLResponse values.
Investigate repeated use of identical assertion identifiers or safely computed response fingerprints.
After remediation, verify one-time-use enforcement through authorized non-production authentication testing.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
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ATT&CK lookup starting points
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cwe · low confidence lookup
CWE-294: Exact CWE lookup
Use the exact CWE identifier as the starting point before reviewing related ATT&CK behavior. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
The CVE wording references authentication or credential exposure, so valid-account and credential-access review may help. This is a Glexia inferred lookup path, not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, or CVE Program mapping.
These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.
1CVSS vectors
3Timeline events
1ADP providers
3Source links
SSVC decision data
CISA-ADPCISA Coordinator
Timestamp
Version
2.0.3
Exploitation: noneAutomatable: yesTechnical Impact: total
CVSS vector scores
1 official score
We collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.
CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.
CWE-294 · source CWE mapping
Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay
Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.