CVE-2026-50011: Netty has unbounded pre-allocation in RedisArrayAggregator from RESP array length
Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, RedisArrayAggregator pre-allocates ArrayList with initial capacity equal to the RESP array element count declared in an array header. That count is taken from the wire before the corresponding child messages exist. A small malicious header can claim a huge initial capacity. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
Netty can be forced to allocate excessive memory when handling a Redis protocol array header. An unauthenticated remote sender may cause a denial of service in affected applications that expose this parser. The issue is patched in Netty 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final.
Executive priority
Prioritize remediation for exposed services that parse Redis/RESP traffic with Netty. This is primarily an availability risk, not a data theft issue, but remote unauthenticated denial of service can still disrupt customer-facing or critical internal systems.
Technical view
RedisArrayAggregator pre-allocates an ArrayList using the RESP array element count declared on the wire before child messages exist. In affected Netty versions, a large declared count can cause unbounded allocation. The CVSS vector indicates network access, low complexity, no privileges, no user interaction, and high availability impact.
Likely exposure
Exposure is most likely in Java applications or products using vulnerable Netty versions and the Redis codec path, especially where Redis/RESP parsing is reachable from untrusted networks. Affected ranges are Netty before 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.0.Final through before 4.2.15.Final.
Exploitation context
The provided bundle does not show CISA KEV listing or active exploitation evidence. The vulnerability is still operationally important because the CVSS vector supports remote unauthenticated denial of service against reachable affected parsing paths.
Researcher notes
Classify as CWE-400 and CWE-770 resource allocation weakness. The key condition is attacker-controlled RESP array length driving pre-allocation before message validation. The bundle confirms patched versions but does not provide detailed patch mechanics; validate through dependency and code-path review rather than exploit reproduction.
Mitigation direction
Upgrade Netty to 4.1.135.Final or 4.2.15.Final.
Inventory direct and transitive Netty dependencies across Java services.
Restrict untrusted network access to Redis/RESP protocol parsing paths.
Apply Red Hat errata updates where Red Hat packages are used.
Restart affected services after dependency or vendor package updates.
Validation and detection
Check SBOMs and dependency trees for io.netty versions.
Identify services using Netty Redis codec or RedisArrayAggregator.
Confirm runtime artifacts resolve to patched Netty versions.
Review vendor advisories for product-specific package status.
Monitor affected services for memory exhaustion or unexpected restarts.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
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Use the exact CWE identifier as the starting point before reviewing related ATT&CK behavior. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
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