CVE-2026-48710: Starlette has missing Host header validation that poisons request.url.path, bypassing path-based security checks
Starlette is a lightweight ASGI framework/toolkit. Prior to version 1.0.1, the HTTP `Host` request header was not validated before being used to reconstruct `request.url`. Because the routing algorithm relies on the raw HTTP path while `request.url` is rebuilt from the `Host` header, a malformed header could make `request.url.path` differ from the path that was actually requested. Middleware and endpoints that apply security restrictions based on `request.url` (rather than the raw `scope` path) could therefore be bypassed. Users should upgrade to a version greater than or equal to version 1.0.1, which validates the `Host` header against the grammar of RFC 9112 §3.2 / RFC 3986 §3.2.2 when constructing `request.url` and falls back to `scope["server"]` for malformed values.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
This issue affects Starlette before 1.0.1. A malformed Host header could make the application believe a different URL path was requested than the one actually routed. If an application made security decisions from request.url, path-based protections could be bypassed.
Executive priority
Treat as a moderate-priority dependency update. It is not reported as actively exploited, but it can undermine path-based security controls in affected Starlette services. Prioritize internet-facing services and apps with custom middleware.
Technical view
Starlette reconstructed request.url from the Host header without validating that header first. Routing used the raw ASGI path, but request.url.path could differ. Code that enforced authorization or restrictions using request.url rather than the raw scope path could apply checks to the wrong path.
Likely exposure
Exposure is most likely in Starlette applications below 1.0.1 where middleware or endpoints use request.url for path-based authorization, filtering, redirects, or access controls. Applications that rely only on router matching or raw scope path are less clearly exposed.
Exploitation context
The source bundle marks this as not in KEV and provides no evidence of active exploitation. The issue is network-reachable, unauthenticated, and low complexity, but impact depends on application-specific security logic using request.url.path.
Researcher notes
Focus triage on the trust boundary between ASGI scope path, Host parsing, and request.url consumers. The central question is whether security logic reads reconstructed URL path data rather than the route path actually matched by Starlette.
Mitigation direction
Upgrade Starlette to version 1.0.1 or later.
Audit middleware and endpoints that make security decisions from request.url.
Prefer raw routed path or validated framework primitives for access checks.
Review Red Hat or platform vendor advisories for packaged deployments.
Add regression tests for malformed Host handling around protected paths.
Validation and detection
Inventory deployed Starlette versions and flag anything below 1.0.1.
Search application code for request.url use in authorization or filtering.
Confirm dependency lockfiles resolve Starlette 1.0.1 or later.
Review tests covering protected routes and Host header parsing behavior.
Check vendor VEX or errata status for managed distributions.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
These mappings and lookup hints may be relevant to the vulnerability behavior, CWE, affected product, or exposure path. Glexia-inferred context is not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, CWE, or CVE Program mapping.
ATT&CK lookup starting points
Use these exact CWE pages and searches to review the Glexia ATT&CK library from this CVE's weakness and description context.
cwe · low confidence lookup
CWE-1289: Exact CWE lookup
Use the exact CWE identifier as the starting point before reviewing related ATT&CK behavior. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
Use the exact CWE identifier as the starting point before reviewing related ATT&CK behavior. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.
We collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.