Traefik is an HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. From 3.7.0 until 3.7.3, there is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's domain-fronting protection (SNICheck) that allows an unauthenticated client to bypass mutual TLS enforced through wildcard router TLSOptions. When a router uses a wildcard host rule such as Host(*.example.com) with stricter TLS options (for example RequireAndVerifyClientCert), SNICheck resolves the TLS options for the HTTP Host header using exact map lookups only and never applies wildcard matching. If another permissive SNI is served on the same entrypoint, an attacker can complete the TLS handshake under the permissive options and then send an HTTP Host header targeting the wildcard-protected backend, reaching it without presenting a client certificate. This affects the regular HTTPS / HTTP-2 path and does not require HTTP/3. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.3.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
Traefik deployments may expose services intended to require client certificates. A remote, unauthenticated attacker could reach a wildcard-protected backend by using a permissive TLS identity served through the same entrypoint. Successful bypass could compromise sensitive data or permit unauthorized changes.
Executive priority
Treat as an immediate remediation priority where Traefik protects sensitive services with wildcard-based mutual TLS. Upgrade exposed systems first, then validate configuration and certificate enforcement. Deployments lacking the required configuration combination are lower priority but should still be inventoried.
Technical view
In Traefik 3.7.0 through 3.7.2, SNICheck uses exact lookups when resolving TLSOptions for the HTTP Host header, ignoring wildcard mappings. A permissive SNI on the same entrypoint can therefore complete TLS before a wildcard Host routes traffic to a backend configured for mutual TLS.
Likely exposure
Exposure requires Traefik 3.7.0 through 3.7.2, a wildcard host rule with stricter TLSOptions, and another permissive SNI on the same entrypoint. Regular HTTPS and HTTP/2 are affected; HTTP/3 is not required.
Exploitation context
The weakness is remotely reachable, requires no authentication or user interaction, and has low stated complexity. The supplied sources do not report active exploitation, and the CVE is not identified as being in KEV.
Researcher notes
The authorization boundary fails because wildcard TLSOptions are omitted from Host-to-SNI policy comparison. Impact is confidentiality and integrity rather than availability, matching CVSS 3.1 score 9.1. Evidence supports affected versions and configuration prerequisites, but not exploitation in the wild.
Mitigation direction
Upgrade affected Traefik installations to version 3.7.3 or later.
Prioritize internet-facing entrypoints that combine wildcard mTLS routes with permissive TLS configurations.
Review the Traefik advisory and release notes for vendor-supported deployment guidance.
Apply relevant Red Hat security updates where Traefik is supplied through affected Red Hat products.
Validation and detection
Inventory Traefik versions and confirm no deployment remains on 3.7.0 through 3.7.2.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
These mappings and lookup hints may be relevant to the vulnerability behavior, CWE, affected product, or exposure path. Glexia-inferred context is not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, CWE, or CVE Program mapping.
ATT&CK lookup starting points
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cwe · low confidence lookup
CWE-288: Exact CWE lookup
Use the exact CWE identifier as the starting point before reviewing related ATT&CK behavior. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
Use the exact CWE identifier as the starting point before reviewing related ATT&CK behavior. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.
2CVSS vectors
5Timeline events
2ADP providers
7Source links
SSVC decision data
CISA-ADPCISA Coordinator
Timestamp
Version
2.0.3
Exploitation: noneAutomatable: yesTechnical Impact: total
CVSS vector scores
2 official scores
We collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.
CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.
CWE-288 · source CWE mapping
Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel
Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.
Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision
Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.