CVE-2026-46512: Frogman: Dialplan template parameters interpolated into extensions_custom.conf without escaping
Frogman provides headless PBX control through MCP and HTTP API. Prior to 1.6.2, fm_dialplan_apply accepted template parameters including greeting, dest, url, extension, code, and file, and Tools/DialplanApply.php wrote Dialplan/Templates.php output to extensions_custom.conf while only Dialplan/TemplateBase.php:38-42 sanitized contextName(), allowing a PERM_WRITE caller using confirm:true to inject arbitrary Asterisk directives such as System(), Set(SHELL(...)), Goto, or Macro. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.2.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
Frogman versions before 1.6.2 can let an already authorized write user turn dialplan template input into dangerous Asterisk configuration. In business terms, a compromised or malicious automation/API account could potentially affect PBX confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The vendor lists this as critical and fixed in 1.6.2.
Executive priority
Treat as urgent for any production PBX automation environment using Frogman before 1.6.2. Prioritize upgrade and access review because the vulnerability crosses from application input into telephony control configuration with critical confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact.
Technical view
fm_dialplan_apply accepted template parameters that were written into extensions_custom.conf without adequate escaping. Only contextName() was sanitized, leaving fields such as greeting, dest, url, extension, code, and file able to inject arbitrary Asterisk directives. The issue requires PERM_WRITE and confirm:true, but has network reachability and high impact per CVSS 9.9.
Likely exposure
Exposure is limited to mwtcmi Frogman deployments before 1.6.2 where MCP or HTTP API users with PERM_WRITE can invoke fm_dialplan_apply. The source bundle does not identify hosted services, default exposure, or affected downstream distributions.
Exploitation context
The provided sources do not report active exploitation, and KEV is false. Exploitation requires an authenticated or otherwise authorized caller with PERM_WRITE and confirm:true. The impact is still severe because successful abuse can inject Asterisk directives into live dialplan configuration.
Researcher notes
Evidence comes from the CVE record, GitHub advisory, fix commit, and release references. The vulnerability is described as CWE-94 code injection through unescaped template parameters. Public sources provided here do not include exploit proof, exploitation telemetry, or detailed deployment prevalence.
Mitigation direction
Upgrade Frogman to version 1.6.2 or later.
Restrict PERM_WRITE access to trusted administrative users only.
Review vendor advisory before applying compensating controls beyond upgrade.
Audit recent generated dialplan configuration for unexpected directives.
Limit MCP and HTTP API reachability to trusted networks where feasible.
Validation and detection
Inventory all Frogman deployments and record installed versions.
Confirm vulnerable instances are upgraded to 1.6.2 or later.
Review accounts and tokens with PERM_WRITE permission.
Inspect extensions_custom.conf for unexpected custom Asterisk directives.
Check logs for recent fm_dialplan_apply activity by write-capable users.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
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ATT&CK lookup starting points
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cwe · medium confidence lookup
CWE-94: Code execution behavior lookup
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1CVSS vectors
3Timeline events
1ADP providers
5Source links
SSVC decision data
CISA-ADPCISA Coordinator
Timestamp
Version
2.0.3
Exploitation: noneAutomatable: noTechnical Impact: total
CVSS vector scores
1 official score
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CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.
CWE-94 · source CWE mapping
Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.