CVE-2026-43503: net: skbuff: propagate shared-frag marker through frag-transfer helpers
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: skbuff: propagate shared-frag marker through frag-transfer helpers
Two frag-transfer helpers (__pskb_copy_fclone() and skb_shift()) fail
to propagate the SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG bit in skb_shinfo()->flags when
moving frags from source to destination. __pskb_copy_fclone() defers
the rest of the shinfo metadata to skb_copy_header() after copying
frag descriptors, but that helper only carries over gso_{size,segs,
type} and never touches skb_shinfo()->flags; skb_shift() moves frag
descriptors directly and leaves flags untouched. As a result, the
destination skb keeps a reference to the same externally-owned or
page-cache-backed pages while reporting skb_has_shared_frag() as
false.
The mismatch is harmful in any in-place writer that uses
skb_has_shared_frag() to decide whether shared pages must be detoured
through skb_cow_data(). ESP input is one such writer (esp4.c,
esp6.c), and a single nft 'dup to <local>' rule -- or any other
nf_dup_ipv4() / xt_TEE caller -- is enough to land a pskb_copy()'d
skb in esp_input() with the marker stripped, letting an unprivileged
user write into the page cache of a root-owned read-only file via
authencesn-ESN stray writes.
Set SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG on the destination whenever frag descriptors
were actually moved from the source. skb_copy() and skb_copy_expand()
share skb_copy_header() too but linearize all paged data into freshly
allocated head storage and emerge with nr_frags == 0, so
skb_has_shared_frag() returns false on its own; they need no change.
The same omission exists in skb_gro_receive() and skb_gro_receive_list().
The former moves the incoming skb's frag descriptors into the
accumulator's last sub-skb via two paths (a direct frag-move loop and
the head_frag + memcpy path); the latter chains the incoming skb whole
onto p's frag_list. Downstream skb_segment() reads only
skb_shinfo(p)->flags, and skb_segment_list() reuses each sub-skb's
shinfo as the nskb -- both p and lp must carry the marker.
The same omission also exists in tcp_clone_payload(), which builds an
MTU probe skb by moving frag descriptors from skbs on sk_write_queue
into a freshly allocated nskb. The helper falls into the same family
and warrants the same fix for consistency; no TCP TX-side in-place
writer is currently known to reach a user page through this gap, but
a future consumer depending on the marker would regress silently.
The same omission exists in skb_segment(): the per-iteration flag
merge takes only head_skb's flag, and the inner switch that rebinds
frag_skb to list_skb on head_skb-frags exhaustion does not fold the
new frag_skb's flag into nskb. Fold frag_skb's flag at both sites
so segments drawing frags from frag_list members carry the marker.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
Linux networking code can lose a marker showing that packet data shares underlying memory. Later processing may modify that memory incorrectly. In the documented ESP receive path, a low-privileged local user could corrupt cached data associated with a root-owned read-only file, creating serious confidentiality, integrity, and availability risk.
Executive priority
Treat this as a high-priority kernel update, particularly on shared or multi-user Linux infrastructure with the documented networking features. Expedite vendor applicability checks and patching. Low privileges can cross an important protection boundary, although the evidence does not support claiming widespread or active exploitation.
Technical view
Several fragment-transfer helpers fail to propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG, allowing skb_has_shared_frag() to return false while fragments still reference shared pages. An in-place writer may consequently skip copy-on-write protection through skb_cow_data(). ESP input is the documented dangerous consumer; GRO, segmentation, and TCP paths were corrected for equivalent marker-loss conditions or future safety.
Likely exposure
Exposure is highest on affected Linux systems permitting untrusted local users and using ESP/IPsec with packet-duplication paths such as nftables duplication or TEE. The record lists affected releases across several kernel branches through 7.1. Exact distribution package and backport status requires vendor verification.
Exploitation context
The record describes a local, low-complexity attack requiring low privileges and no user interaction. It is not listed in KEV, and the supplied sources do not establish active exploitation. The concrete documented impact path depends on ESP input and locally duplicated packet processing.
Researcher notes
The fixes propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG when descriptors move and merge flags when segmentation sources change. skb_copy() and skb_copy_expand() are excluded because they linearize paged data. ESP input is the known dangerous writer. The record explicitly identifies no current TCP transmit-side writer exposing user pages through the tcp_clone_payload() gap.
Mitigation direction
Install the appropriate vendor-fixed kernel package, then reboot into the updated kernel.
Use the applicable distribution advisory to identify corrected packages for every maintained kernel branch.
Prioritize multi-user systems and hosts using IPsec/ESP or nftables/TEE packet duplication.
Follow vendor guidance for temporary mitigations; the supplied sources name no supported configuration workaround.
Validation and detection
Inventory active kernel versions and distribution package releases across Linux systems.
Compare each package with its vendor advisory and corresponding stable-kernel fix.
Confirm the corrected kernel is active after reboot, not merely installed.
Review ESP/IPsec use and nftables or TEE duplication rules to refine urgency.
Avoid attempting page-cache corruption when validating production systems.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
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Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime
Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.