CVE-2026-42791: OCSP responder certificate validity period not checked in public_key
Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Erlang OTP public_key (pubkey_ocsp module) allows forged OCSP responses signed with an expired responder certificate to be accepted as valid.
OCSP response verification in pubkey_ocsp:verify_response/5 and pubkey_ocsp:is_authorized_responder/3 in lib/public_key/src/pubkey_ocsp.erl does not check the validity period (notBefore/notAfter) of the OCSP responder certificate. An attacker who has obtained the private key of an expired CA-designated OCSP responder certificate can forge OCSP responses that Erlang/OTP accepts as valid.
This affects TLS clients using OCSP stapling via the ssl application: a malicious or compromised server can present a revoked TLS certificate together with a forged OCSP response signed by an expired responder key, and the client will accept the revoked certificate as valid. It also affects applications calling public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 directly, where the impact depends on the use case — server-side client certificate validation using this API may allow authentication bypass with a revoked client certificate.
This issue affects OTP from OTP 27.0 before OTP 29.0.1, OTP 28.5.0.1 and OTP 27.3.4.12, corresponding to public_key from 1.16 before 1.21.1, 1.20.3.1 and 1.17.1.3.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
Affected Erlang/OTP applications may trust a revoked certificate because OCSP validation fails to check whether the responder certificate has expired. Abuse requires possession of that expired responder certificate's private key. The main risks are accepting a revoked server certificate or, in some direct API uses, allowing authentication with a revoked client certificate.
Executive priority
Treat this as an accelerated maintenance item rather than a general emergency. Raise priority for internet-facing Erlang TLS clients using OCSP stapling and services using OCSP-backed client-certificate authentication. Exploitation prerequisites are substantial, but successful abuse could undermine certificate revocation and authentication controls.
Technical view
The pubkey_ocsp verification paths accept OCSP responses signed by an authorized but expired responder certificate without validating its notBefore and notAfter dates. A forged response can therefore make a revoked certificate appear valid. Relevant paths include TLS clients using OCSP stapling and applications calling public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 directly.
Likely exposure
Exposure begins with OTP 27.0 and depends on the maintained branch. Fixed releases are OTP 27.3.4.12, 28.5.0.1, and 29.0.1, corresponding to public_key 1.17.1.3, 1.20.3.1, and 1.21.1. Systems not using OCSP stapling or direct OCSP validation are less likely to be affected.
Exploitation context
Exploitation requires the private key of an expired CA-designated OCSP responder certificate and a malicious or compromised server, or another suitable response-delivery position. The CVSS v4.0 score is 6.3 with high complexity and additional prerequisites. KEV is false, and the provided sources do not establish active exploitation.
Researcher notes
Impact depends on application behavior after successful OCSP validation. The source bundle describes limited integrity effects rather than confidentiality or availability impact. Its structured affected-package entries are less precise than the narrative branch information, so confirm exact version status against the vendor advisory and relevant patch commits.
Mitigation direction
Upgrade to OTP 27.3.4.12, 28.5.0.1, or 29.0.1, as appropriate for the maintained release branch.
Alternatively, update public_key to the corresponding fixed release supported by the deployed OTP branch.
If immediate upgrading is unavailable, consult Erlang's advisory for supported guidance and reduce reliance on affected OCSP validation.
Prioritize services using OCSP-backed client-certificate authentication or processing sensitive connections.
Validation and detection
Inventory deployed Erlang/OTP and public_key versions, including bundled runtimes and containers.
Identify TLS clients using OCSP stapling and applications calling public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 directly.
Confirm upgraded nodes report a fixed branch version and all affected services were restarted or redeployed.
Test authorized staging systems to confirm OCSP responses using expired responder certificates are rejected.
Review client-certificate authentication paths where accepting revoked credentials could grant access.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
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cwe · low confidence lookup
CWE-295: Exact CWE lookup
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CWE-295 · source CWE mapping
Improper Certificate Validation
Improper Certificate Validation represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.
Operation on a Resource after Expiration or Release
Operation on a Resource after Expiration or Release represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.