CVE-2026-33805: @fastify/reply-from vulnerable to connection header abuse enabling stripping of proxy-added headers
@fastify/reply-from v12.6.1 and earlier and @fastify/http-proxy v11.4.3 and earlier process the client's Connection header after the proxy has added its own headers via rewriteRequestHeaders. This allows attackers to retroactively strip proxy-added headers from upstream requests by listing them in the Connection header value. Any header added by the proxy for routing, access control, or security purposes can be selectively removed by a client. @fastify/http-proxy is also affected as it delegates to @fastify/reply-from.
Upgrade to @fastify/reply-from v12.6.2 or @fastify/http-proxy v11.4.4 or later.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
Some Fastify proxy deployments can let an unauthenticated client remove headers that the proxy itself adds before forwarding a request. If those headers drive routing, access control, tenant isolation, or security decisions, upstream services may receive a less-trusted request than intended. The vendor fix is to upgrade the affected packages.
Executive priority
Treat this as urgent for internet-facing Fastify proxy services that rely on added headers for security decisions. The business risk is unauthorized request handling or policy bypass in affected service paths. Patch priority should be high, with exposure triage focused on proxy-to-upstream trust boundaries.
Technical view
@fastify/reply-from <=12.6.1 handles the client Connection header after rewriteRequestHeaders adds proxy headers. Because Connection names hop-by-hop headers, a client can name proxy-added headers and cause them to be stripped before the upstream request. @fastify/http-proxy <=11.4.3 inherits the issue through reply-from. The advisory maps this to CWE-444 and CWE-644 with CVSS 4.0 score 9.0.
Likely exposure
Exposure is likely in Node.js services using Fastify proxy components, especially where rewriteRequestHeaders adds authentication, authorization, routing, tenant, or security headers. Applications not using these packages, not using proxy-added headers, or already upgraded to fixed versions are less likely to be exposed.
Exploitation context
The source bundle does not show CISA KEV listing or cited evidence of active exploitation. The issue is remotely reachable, unauthenticated, and low complexity, but requires an application context where stripped proxy-added headers affect upstream trust decisions.
Researcher notes
The key validation question is whether upstream services trust headers inserted by the Fastify proxy. Evidence supports header stripping through Connection processing order, but impact depends on application-specific header semantics. Do not assume compromise without logs or telemetry showing relevant missing-header behavior.
Mitigation direction
Upgrade @fastify/reply-from to v12.6.2 or later.
Upgrade @fastify/http-proxy to v11.4.4 or later.
Prioritize services where proxy-added headers influence access control or routing.
Check vendor advisories for any additional package-specific guidance.
Redeploy affected services after dependency updates.
Validation and detection
Inventory package manifests, lockfiles, and SBOMs for affected Fastify packages.
Identify proxy code using rewriteRequestHeaders to add security-relevant headers.
Confirm production builds resolve to fixed package versions.
Review upstream logs for requests missing expected proxy-added headers.
Regression test that required proxy headers still reach upstream services.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
These mappings and lookup hints may be relevant to the vulnerability behavior, CWE, affected product, or exposure path. Glexia-inferred context is not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, CWE, or CVE Program mapping.
ATT&CK lookup starting points
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cwe · low confidence lookup
CWE-444: Exact CWE lookup
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Use the exact CWE identifier as the starting point before reviewing related ATT&CK behavior. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
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CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.
CWE-444 · source CWE mapping
Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')
Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling') represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.
Improper Neutralization of HTTP Headers for Scripting Syntax
Improper Neutralization of HTTP Headers for Scripting Syntax represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.