When using an IPv6 allow-list for the Auth Proxy feature, it defaults to /32 addresses. Addresses specifying a mask explicitly are not affected; to mitigate easily, add the desired mask (usually /128) to the addresses. Only auth proxy is affected; Okta, SAML, LDAP, etc are unaffected here.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
Grafana OSS deployments using Auth Proxy with IPv6 allow-lists may trust a much broader IPv6 range than intended. If an entry lacks an explicit mask, it defaults to /32 instead of a single host. This can let unauthorized remote clients bypass the whitelist and gain access paths protected by Auth Proxy.
Executive priority
Treat this as high priority where Grafana Auth Proxy is internet-facing or protects sensitive operational data. The fix appears configuration-focused, but affected environments should be found quickly because the issue can undermine an access boundary.
Technical view
CVE-2026-33376 is a CWE-1188 Auth Proxy IPv6 allow-list misconfiguration flaw in Grafana OSS. IPv6 entries without an explicit CIDR mask default to /32. Explicitly masked entries are not affected. CVSS 3.1 is 7.4: network reachable, no privileges or user interaction, high confidentiality and integrity impact, high attack complexity.
Likely exposure
Exposure is limited to Grafana OSS instances using the Auth Proxy feature with IPv6 allow-list entries missing explicit masks. Okta, SAML, LDAP, and other authentication methods are stated as unaffected by this issue.
Exploitation context
The bundle does not report known active exploitation, and KEV is false. Exploitation appears configuration-dependent and high complexity, but the impact could be serious where Auth Proxy guards sensitive dashboards or administrative functions.
Researcher notes
The strongest evidence is the Grafana advisory and CVE data. The bundle names affected Grafana OSS versions but does not provide exploit evidence or complete patch status. Validation should focus on Auth Proxy configuration semantics, not offensive bypass testing.
Mitigation direction
Add explicit CIDR masks to every IPv6 Auth Proxy allow-list entry.
Use /128 for single IPv6 hosts unless vendor guidance says otherwise.
Review Grafana’s advisory for fixed-version or upgrade guidance.
Confirm non-Auth Proxy authentication paths do not rely on this allow-list.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
These mappings and lookup hints may be relevant to the vulnerability behavior, CWE, affected product, or exposure path. Glexia-inferred context is not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, CWE, or CVE Program mapping.
ATT&CK lookup starting points
Use these exact CWE pages and searches to review the Glexia ATT&CK library from this CVE's weakness and description context.
cwe · low confidence lookup
CWE-1188: Exact CWE lookup
Use the exact CWE identifier as the starting point before reviewing related ATT&CK behavior. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.
1CVSS vectors
3Timeline events
1ADP providers
2Source links
SSVC decision data
CISA-ADPCISA Coordinator
Timestamp
Version
2.0.3
Exploitation: noneAutomatable: noTechnical Impact: total
CVSS vector scores
1 official score
We collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.
CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.
CWE-1188 · source CWE mapping
Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default
Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.