When using an IPv6 allow-list for the Auth Proxy feature, it defaults to /32 addresses. Addresses specifying a mask explicitly are not affected; to mitigate easily, add the desired mask (usually /128) to the addresses. Only auth proxy is affected; Okta, SAML, LDAP, etc are unaffected here.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
Grafana Auth Proxy can treat an IPv6 allow-list entry without an explicit mask as a /32 network instead of one address. This may trust far more IPv6 sources than intended, allowing unauthorized access and changes through Auth Proxy. Other authentication methods, including Okta, SAML, and LDAP, are not affected by this issue.
Executive priority
Prioritize promptly where internet-accessible or sensitive Grafana deployments use Auth Proxy with IPv6 allow-lists. The issue can undermine an authentication trust boundary and expose dashboards or permit unauthorized changes. Lower the priority only after confirming Auth Proxy is unused or every IPv6 entry already has an explicit, correct mask.
Technical view
The flaw is an insecure default in Auth Proxy IPv6 allow-list parsing. Unmasked IPv6 entries default to /32, creating an overly broad trusted range. CVSS 3.1 rates it 7.4: remotely reachable, unauthenticated, high complexity, with high confidentiality and integrity impact but no availability impact.
Likely exposure
Exposure requires Grafana OSS using Auth Proxy with IPv6 allow-list entries that omit an explicit prefix length. Installations using explicit masks are not affected by this behavior. The bundle identifies specific releases from 9.4.0 through 13.0.1; confirm exact applicability against Grafana’s advisory.
Exploitation context
The CVE is not listed in KEV, and the supplied sources do not report active exploitation or a public exploit. Exploitation is network-based, requires no privileges or user interaction, but is rated high complexity. Risk depends on whether an attacker-controlled IPv6 address falls within an unintentionally trusted /32 range.
Researcher notes
CWE-1188 reflects an insecure default initialization. The decisive condition is omitted IPv6 prefix length, not IPv6 use alone. The record’s default status is unaffected outside the identified versions, but version interpretation should be confirmed with Grafana. No evidence supplied supports active exploitation, availability impact, or impact to non-Auth-Proxy authentication.
Mitigation direction
Add an explicit intended prefix length to every Auth Proxy IPv6 allow-list entry, usually /128 for one address.
Review Grafana’s security advisory for supported fixed versions or additional vendor remediation guidance.
Restrict network access to Grafana while configuration review and remediation are underway.
Do not alter unaffected Okta, SAML, or LDAP configurations solely for this CVE.
Validation and detection
Confirm whether Auth Proxy and IPv6 source allow-listing are enabled.
Inventory every IPv6 allow-list entry and identify addresses lacking an explicit prefix length.
Verify single-host entries use /128 and network entries use the deliberately intended prefix.
Confirm the deployed Grafana OSS version against the vendor advisory’s affected and fixed-version guidance.
After remediation, verify only intended IPv6 sources are accepted through Auth Proxy.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
These mappings and lookup hints may be relevant to the vulnerability behavior, CWE, affected product, or exposure path. Glexia-inferred context is not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, CWE, or CVE Program mapping.
ATT&CK lookup starting points
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cwe · low confidence lookup
CWE-1188: Exact CWE lookup
Use the exact CWE identifier as the starting point before reviewing related ATT&CK behavior. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.
1CVSS vectors
3Timeline events
1ADP providers
2Source links
SSVC decision data
CISA-ADPCISA Coordinator
Timestamp
Version
2.0.3
Exploitation: noneAutomatable: noTechnical Impact: total
CVSS vector scores
1 official score
We collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.
CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.
CWE-1188 · source CWE mapping
Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default
Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.