OpenClaw before 2026.3.12 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in Feishu webhook mode when only verificationToken is configured without encryptKey, allowing acceptance of forged events. Unauthenticated network attackers can inject forged Feishu events and trigger downstream tool execution by reaching the webhook endpoint.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
OpenClaw, an open-source integration tool, has a flaw in how it verifies messages from Feishu (a workplace chat platform). If administrators set it up with only a verification token and skip the encryption key, attackers on the internet can send fake Feishu events that OpenClaw will trust and act on. That trust can trigger downstream automated actions the attacker chose.
Executive priority
High priority for teams using OpenClaw with Feishu integrations. Schedule the upgrade within the next standard patch cycle and require encryptKey to be configured before re-enabling the webhook. If OpenClaw drives automated actions on production systems, treat this as an expedited change rather than a routine update.
Technical view
The vulnerability (CWE-347, improper signature verification) affects OpenClaw versions before 2026.3.12 running in Feishu webhook mode with verificationToken set but no encryptKey. Because the token alone is not a cryptographic signature, unauthenticated remote attackers who reach the webhook endpoint can submit forged Feishu event payloads. Accepted events can invoke connected tools, giving high integrity impact per the 8.8 CVSS v4.0 score.
Likely exposure
Any internet-reachable OpenClaw instance configured in Feishu webhook mode without encryptKey is exposed. Deployments behind private networks, VPNs, or with encryptKey configured are not exposed by this specific flaw. Sources do not enumerate installed base or a scan estimate.
Exploitation context
No public reports of in-the-wild exploitation and not listed in CISA KEV per the source bundle. However, the flaw is unauthenticated and network-reachable, so the practical barrier is discovery of the webhook URL. Treat as high pre-exploitation risk pending further vendor telemetry or public PoC.
Researcher notes
CWE-347 confirms this is a signature-verification gap, not a token leak. The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N, VI:H) aligns with unauthenticated remote forgery with high integrity impact. Validation should focus on whether the fixed release rejects payloads that carry a valid verificationToken but no valid encrypted signature, and whether misconfiguration warnings are surfaced on startup.
Mitigation direction
Upgrade OpenClaw to version 2026.3.12 or later as directed by the GitHub Security Advisory.
Configure encryptKey alongside verificationToken so Feishu payloads are cryptographically verified.
Restrict webhook endpoint access to Feishu source ranges or place it behind an authenticated gateway.
Audit downstream tools OpenClaw can invoke and apply least-privilege scopes to reduce blast radius.
Monitor vendor advisory channels for follow-up guidance and any newly disclosed variants.
Validation and detection
Inventory OpenClaw deployments and record installed versions against the 2026.3.12 fix line.
Review configuration for Feishu webhook mode and confirm whether encryptKey is set.
Confirm webhook endpoints are not directly reachable from the public internet where not required.
Review OpenClaw and downstream tool logs for unexpected Feishu event invocations.
Re-test after upgrade to confirm forged events lacking valid signatures are rejected.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
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cwe · low confidence lookup
CWE-347: Exact CWE lookup
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CWE-347 · source CWE mapping
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.