CVE-2026-32144: OCSP designated-responder authorization bypass via missing signature verification
Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Erlang OTP public_key (pubkey_ocsp module) allows OCSP designated-responder authorization bypass via missing signature verification.
The OCSP response validation in public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 does not verify that a CA-designated responder certificate was cryptographically signed by the issuing CA. Instead, it only checks that the responder certificate's issuer name matches the CA's subject name and that the certificate has the OCSPSigning extended key usage. An attacker who can intercept or control OCSP responses can create a self-signed certificate with a matching issuer name and the OCSPSigning EKU, and use it to forge OCSP responses that mark revoked certificates as valid.
This affects SSL/TLS clients using OCSP stapling, which may accept connections to servers with revoked certificates, potentially transmitting sensitive data to compromised servers. Applications using the public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 API directly are also affected, with impact depending on usage context.
This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/public_key/src/pubkey_ocsp.erl and program routines pubkey_ocsp:is_authorized_responder/3.
This issue affects OTP from OTP 27.0 until OTP 28.4.2 and 27.3.4.10 corresponding to public_key from 1.16 until 1.20.3 and 1.17.1.2, and ssl from 11.2 until 11.5.4 and 11.2.12.7.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
Erlang/OTP could accept a forged OCSP status response from a fake designated responder. A client relying on OCSP stapling might treat a revoked TLS certificate as valid, exposing sensitive traffic to a compromised or impersonated server.
Executive priority
Treat as high priority for Erlang-based systems that rely on TLS certificate revocation checks. The issue can undermine a key trust control, but evidence in the supplied sources does not support emergency active-exploitation handling.
Technical view
In public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5, pubkey_ocsp:is_authorized_responder/3 checked issuer name and OCSPSigning EKU but did not verify the responder certificate signature chain to the issuing CA. This impacts OTP 27.0 through fixed 27.3.4.10/28.4.2 lines and related public_key and ssl versions.
Likely exposure
Exposure is most likely in Erlang/OTP TLS clients that validate OCSP stapling, and applications directly calling public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5. Server-side risk depends on whether clients enforce OCSP status through affected OTP libraries.
Exploitation context
The bundle does not show CISA KEV listing or active exploitation. Exploitation requires an attacker able to intercept or control OCSP responses and a victim path where OCSP validation influences trust decisions.
Researcher notes
Focus review on OCSP responder authorization and certificate path validation. The core flaw is authorization based on issuer-name match and EKU without cryptographic verification that the CA signed the responder certificate.
Mitigation direction
Upgrade Erlang/OTP to vendor fixed releases 27.3.4.10 or 28.4.2 where applicable.
Update public_key and ssl package versions consistent with the fixed OTP release line.
Review Erlang advisory GHSA-gxrm-pf64-99xm for release-specific guidance.
If immediate upgrade is blocked, assess disabling reliance on affected OCSP validation paths.
Prioritize internet-facing clients handling sensitive data or high-trust TLS connections.
Validation and detection
Inventory Erlang/OTP runtime versions across production, CI images, and containers.
Identify use of public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 and OCSP stapling in TLS clients.
Confirm public_key and ssl versions are outside the affected ranges.
Review dependency locks and base images for embedded Erlang/OTP packages.
Check vendor advisories for distribution-specific status, especially Red Hat packages.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
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ATT&CK lookup starting points
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cwe · low confidence lookup
CWE-295: Exact CWE lookup
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The CVE wording references privilege impact, so privilege escalation and authorization behavior review may help. This is a Glexia inferred lookup path, not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, or CVE Program mapping.
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2CVSS vectors
5Timeline events
2ADP providers
10Source links
SSVC decision data
CISA-ADPCISA Coordinator
Timestamp
Version
2.0.3
Exploitation: noneAutomatable: noTechnical Impact: total
CVSS vector scores
2 official scores
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CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.
CWE-295 · source CWE mapping
Improper Certificate Validation
Improper Certificate Validation represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.