CVE-2026-28498: Authlib: Fail-Open Cryptographic Verification in OIDC Hash Binding
Authlib is a Python library which builds OAuth and OpenID Connect servers. Prior to version 1.6.9, a library-level vulnerability was identified in the Authlib Python library concerning the validation of OpenID Connect (OIDC) ID Tokens. Specifically, the internal hash verification logic (_verify_hash) responsible for validating the at_hash (Access Token Hash) and c_hash (Authorization Code Hash) claims exhibits a fail-open behavior when encountering an unsupported or unknown cryptographic algorithm. This flaw allows an attacker to bypass mandatory integrity protections by supplying a forged ID Token with a deliberately unrecognized alg header parameter. The library intercepts the unsupported state and silently returns True (validation passed), inherently violating fundamental cryptographic design principles and direct OIDC specifications. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.9.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
Authlib versions before 1.6.9 can mistakenly accept forged OpenID Connect token bindings when an unknown cryptographic algorithm is supplied. For organizations using Authlib in login or SSO flows, this could undermine trust decisions around identity tokens. The source bundle names a fix in Authlib 1.6.9.
Executive priority
High priority for any business system using Authlib in authentication. Patch quickly because the issue can affect identity assurance and access control decisions. Do not assume compromise from the provided evidence; focus on rapid inventory, upgrade, and validation.
Technical view
The flaw is in Authlib's internal OIDC _verify_hash handling for at_hash and c_hash. Unsupported or unknown algorithms fail open, returning validation success instead of rejecting the token hash check. This weakens integrity binding between ID Tokens and access tokens or authorization codes. A patch is identified in version 1.6.9.
Likely exposure
Most likely exposed systems are Python applications using Authlib before 1.6.9 for OpenID Connect ID Token validation, especially flows relying on at_hash or c_hash. Exposure depends on whether Authlib handles token validation in the deployed authentication path. Red Hat-listed packages should be checked against their advisories.
Exploitation context
The source bundle describes a network-reachable, unauthenticated, low-complexity bypass with high confidentiality and integrity impact. It does not provide evidence of active exploitation, and KEV status is false. Treat as urgent because it affects authentication trust, not because exploitation is confirmed.
Researcher notes
Key evidence is the Authlib advisory, patch commit, and 1.6.9 release reference. The bundle attributes CWE-325, CWE-354, and CWE-573. Avoid broad claims beyond Authlib before 1.6.9 and vendor-packaged variants unless confirmed by the cited advisories.
Mitigation direction
Upgrade Authlib to version 1.6.9 or later.
Check Red Hat advisories for backported package fixes.
Prioritize internet-facing and SSO-dependent applications first.
Review vendor guidance before applying compensating controls.
Monitor Authlib and distribution advisories for updates.
Validation and detection
Inventory deployed Authlib versions across Python environments.
Identify OIDC flows that validate ID Tokens with Authlib.
Confirm deployed builds include Authlib 1.6.9 or a vendor backport.
Review dependency locks, container images, and base images.
Retest authentication flows after upgrading packages.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
These mappings and lookup hints may be relevant to the vulnerability behavior, CWE, affected product, or exposure path. Glexia-inferred context is not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, CWE, or CVE Program mapping.
ATT&CK lookup starting points
Use these exact CWE pages and searches to review the Glexia ATT&CK library from this CVE's weakness and description context.
cwe · low confidence lookup
CWE-325: Exact CWE lookup
Use the exact CWE identifier as the starting point before reviewing related ATT&CK behavior. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
Use the exact CWE identifier as the starting point before reviewing related ATT&CK behavior. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
Use the exact CWE identifier as the starting point before reviewing related ATT&CK behavior. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
The CVE wording references authentication or credential exposure, so valid-account and credential-access review may help. This is a Glexia inferred lookup path, not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, or CVE Program mapping.
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We collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.
CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.
CWE-325 · source CWE mapping
Missing Cryptographic Step
Missing Cryptographic Step represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.
Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.
Improper Following of Specification by Caller represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.