Calero VeraSMART versions prior to 2022 R1 use static ASP.NET/IIS machineKey values configured for the VeraSMART web application and stored in C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Veramark\\VeraSMART\\WebRoot\\web.config. An attacker who obtains these keys can craft a valid ASP.NET ViewState payload that passes integrity validation and is accepted by the application, resulting in server-side deserialization and remote code execution in the context of the IIS application.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
Older Calero VeraSMART deployments used shared, predictable web application cryptographic keys. If an attacker obtains those keys, the application may trust a malicious ViewState object and run attacker-controlled code on the server. This is critical for exposed or high-value VeraSMART environments.
Executive priority
Handle as an urgent remediation item if VeraSMART is deployed. The business risk is full server compromise of a telecom expense management system, but urgency depends on whether vulnerable versions are present and reachable.
Technical view
Calero VeraSMART versions before 2022 R1 use static ASP.NET/IIS machineKey values in the VeraSMART web.config. Possession of those keys lets an unauthenticated network attacker create ViewState data that passes validation, causing server-side deserialization and remote code execution as the IIS application. CVSS v4.0 is 9.3.
Likely exposure
Highest exposure is VeraSMART web applications running versions earlier than 2022 R1, especially if reachable from untrusted networks. Environments where web.config or machineKey values were disclosed, copied, backed up insecurely, or reused should be treated as higher risk.
Exploitation context
The provided bundle marks KEV as false, and no supplied source states active exploitation. Exploitation requires the attacker to obtain the machineKey values, then abuse ASP.NET ViewState trust. The impact is still severe because successful exploitation gives remote code execution.
Researcher notes
The core issue is CWE-321: use of hard-coded cryptographic key material. Evidence in the bundle supports RCE only when keys are obtained. Do not assume exploitation in the wild without KEV listing or another cited source confirming it.
Mitigation direction
Identify all Calero VeraSMART instances and their versions.
Prioritize upgrade planning for any instance older than 2022 R1.
Check Calero guidance for the supported fix or configuration remediation.
Restrict VeraSMART web access to trusted networks while remediation is pending.
Treat exposed machineKey values as compromised and follow vendor rotation guidance.
Validation and detection
Confirm whether each VeraSMART instance is earlier than 2022 R1.
Review VeraSMART web.config handling and access controls for key exposure risk.
Check logs for unusual VeraSMART web requests or IIS application activity.
Verify post-remediation version and configuration against Calero guidance.
Document internet exposure, compensating controls, and remediation status.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
These mappings and lookup hints may be relevant to the vulnerability behavior, CWE, affected product, or exposure path. Glexia-inferred context is not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, CWE, or CVE Program mapping.
ATT&CK lookup starting points
Use these exact CWE pages and searches to review the Glexia ATT&CK library from this CVE's weakness and description context.
cwe · low confidence lookup
CWE-321: Exact CWE lookup
Use the exact CWE identifier as the starting point before reviewing related ATT&CK behavior. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
The CVE wording references code or command execution, so execution technique review may help defensive triage. This is a Glexia inferred lookup path, not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, or CVE Program mapping.
These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.
1CVSS vectors
3Timeline events
1ADP providers
3Source links
SSVC decision data
CISA-ADPCISA Coordinator
Timestamp
Version
2.0.3
Exploitation: noneAutomatable: yesTechnical Impact: total
CVSS vector scores
1 official score
We collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.
CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.
CWE-321 · source CWE mapping
Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key
Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.