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CVE Record

CVE-2026-22977: net: sock: fix hardened usercopy panic in sock_recv_errqueue

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: sock: fix hardened usercopy panic in sock_recv_errqueue skbuff_fclone_cache was created without defining a usercopy region, [1] unlike skbuff_head_cache which properly whitelists the cb[] field. [2] This causes a usercopy BUG() when CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled and the kernel attempts to copy sk_buff.cb data to userspace via sock_recv_errqueue() -> put_cmsg(). The crash occurs when: 1. TCP allocates an skb using alloc_skb_fclone() (from skbuff_fclone_cache) [1] 2. The skb is cloned via skb_clone() using the pre-allocated fclone [3] 3. The cloned skb is queued to sk_error_queue for timestamp reporting 4. Userspace reads the error queue via recvmsg(MSG_ERRQUEUE) 5. sock_recv_errqueue() calls put_cmsg() to copy serr->ee from skb->cb [4] 6. __check_heap_object() fails because skbuff_fclone_cache has no usercopy whitelist [5] When cloned skbs allocated from skbuff_fclone_cache are used in the socket error queue, accessing the sock_exterr_skb structure in skb->cb via put_cmsg() triggers a usercopy hardening violation: [ 5.379589] usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object 'skbuff_fclone_cache' (offset 296, size 16)! [ 5.382796] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102! [ 5.383923] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 5.384903] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 138 Comm: poc_put_cmsg Not tainted 6.12.57 #7 [ 5.384903] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 5.384903] RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort+0x6c/0x80 [ 5.384903] Code: 1a 86 51 48 c7 c2 40 15 1a 86 41 52 48 c7 c7 c0 15 1a 86 48 0f 45 d6 48 c7 c6 80 15 1a 86 48 89 c1 49 0f 45 f3 e8 84 27 88 ff <0f> 0b 490 [ 5.384903] RSP: 0018:ffffc900006f77a8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 5.384903] RAX: 000000000000006f RBX: ffff88800f0ad2a8 RCX: 1ffffffff0f72e74 [ 5.384903] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff87b973a0 [ 5.384903] RBP: 0000000000000010 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff0f72e74 [ 5.384903] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 79706f6372657375 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 5.384903] R13: ffff88800f0ad2b8 R14: ffffea00003c2b40 R15: ffffea00003c2b00 [ 5.384903] FS: 0000000011bc4380(0000) GS:ffff8880bf100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 5.384903] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 5.384903] CR2: 000056aa3b8e5fe4 CR3: 000000000ea26004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [ 5.384903] PKRU: 55555554 [ 5.384903] Call Trace: [ 5.384903] <TASK> [ 5.384903] __check_heap_object+0x9a/0xd0 [ 5.384903] __check_object_size+0x46c/0x690 [ 5.384903] put_cmsg+0x129/0x5e0 [ 5.384903] sock_recv_errqueue+0x22f/0x380 [ 5.384903] tls_sw_recvmsg+0x7ed/0x1960 [ 5.384903] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 5.384903] ? schedule+0x6d/0x270 [ 5.384903] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 5.384903] ? mutex_unlock+0x81/0xd0 [ 5.384903] ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10 [ 5.384903] ? __pfx_tls_sw_recvmsg+0x10/0x10 [ 5.384903] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x8f/0xf0 [ 5.384903] ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x20/0x40 [ 5.384903] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 The crash offset 296 corresponds to skb2->cb within skbuff_fclones: - sizeof(struct sk_buff) = 232 - offsetof(struct sk_buff, cb) = 40 - offset of skb2.cb in fclones = 232 + 40 = 272 - crash offset 296 = 272 + 24 (inside sock_exterr_skb.ee) This patch uses a local stack variable as a bounce buffer to avoid the hardened usercopy check failure. [1] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/ipv4/tcp.c#L885 [2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/core/skbuff.c#L5104 [3] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/core/skbuff.c#L5566 [4] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/core/skbuff.c#L5491 [5] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/mm/slub.c#L5719

UnknownCVSS not scoredNot KEV-listedUpdated
Glexia's TakeAutomated analysismoderate

Security readout for executives and security teams

Plain-English summary

A Linux networking flaw can crash kernels with hardened user-copy protection when an application reads certain TCP error-queue data. The result is primarily an availability risk: an affected system may panic or terminate critical workloads. The supplied evidence does not establish data theft, code execution, or active exploitation.

Executive priority

Treat this as a targeted availability issue, not a demonstrated system-compromise emergency. Patch affected production kernels through normal expedited maintenance, prioritizing critical network services and embedded appliances where a kernel panic would cause material downtime. Escalate urgency if vendors confirm remote reachability or exploitation.

Technical view

Cloned TCP socket buffers from skbuff_fclone_cache lack the user-copy region defined for skbuff_head_cache. When such a buffer reaches sk_error_queue, recvmsg(MSG_ERRQUEUE) can make sock_recv_errqueue() pass skb->cb data to put_cmsg(), triggering CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY and a kernel BUG. The fix copies through a local stack buffer.

Likely exposure

Exposure requires an affected Linux kernel, CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, and the documented TCP buffer cloning, timestamp error-queue, and userspace read conditions. The bundle identifies affected versions from 4.16 through listed stable releases ending at 6.19, but does not provide reliable distribution-package mappings or complete version ranges.

Exploitation context

The supplied record is not in KEV and provides no evidence of active exploitation. It documents a reproducible kernel panic, indicating denial-of-service potential when the required networking path is reachable. It does not establish remote triggerability, required privileges, public weaponization, or consequences beyond the demonstrated crash.

Researcher notes

The failure is a hardened-usercopy whitelist mismatch for skb2->cb inside skbuff_fclones. The documented offset falls within sock_exterr_skb.ee, and the correction uses a stack bounce buffer before put_cmsg(). Exact introduction and fixed-version boundaries are unclear from the supplied version list; validate against each stable commit and downstream backports.

Mitigation direction

  • Update to a vendor-supported kernel containing the referenced stable fix.
  • Check distribution and appliance advisories for exact corrected package versions.
  • Prioritize exposed, availability-critical systems using hardened user-copy kernels.
  • Apply vendor-recommended temporary mitigations if immediate kernel replacement is unavailable.

Validation and detection

  • Record running kernel versions and confirm CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY status.
  • Map vendor kernel packages to the referenced stable commits.
  • Search kernel logs for usercopy violations involving skbuff_fclone_cache and sock_recv_errqueue.
  • Verify updated systems boot the corrected kernel, not an older installed image.
  • Test affected timestamping and error-queue workloads safely after updating.
Prepared
Confidence
medium
Sources
9

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Potential ATT&CK relevance

Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context

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Vulnerability profileCVE Program record
Severity
Unknown
CVSS
Not scored
Known Exploited
No
Published
Official CVE source material

CNA and ADP enrichment extracted from CVE v5

These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.

0CVSS vectors
3Timeline events
2ADP providers
10Source links

SSVC decision data

CISA-ADPCISA Coordinator
Timestamp
Version
2.0.3
Exploitation: noneAutomatable: noTechnical Impact: partial

Vulnerability timeline

Timeline events are normalized from CVE metadata, CNA source timelines, ADP timelines, and KEV metadata when present.

  1. CVE reservedCVE Program

    The CVE ID was reserved by the assigning CNA.

  2. CVE publishedCVE Program

    The CVE record was published.

  3. CVE updatedCVE Program

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ADP provider summaries

siemens-SADPADP container
CISA-ADPCISA ADP Vulnrichment
other:ssvc
Affected products

Products and packages named in the record

VendorProductVersion / packageStatus
LinuxLinux6d07d1cd300f4c7e16005f881fea388164999cc8, 6d07d1cd300f4c7e16005f881fea388164999cc8, 6d07d1cd300f4c7e16005f881fea388164999cc8, 6d07d1cd300f4c7e16005f881fea388164999cc8, 6d07d1cd300f4c7e16005f881fea388164999cc8, 6d07d1cd300f4c7e16005f881fea388164999cc8, 6d07d1cd300f4c7e16005f881fea388164999cc8unaffected
LinuxLinux4.16, 0, 5.10.248, 5.15.198, 6.1.161, 6.6.121, 6.12.66, 6.18.6, 6.19affected
Weakness

CWE details

No CWE listed

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