Windows Secure Boot stores Microsoft certificates in the UEFI KEK and DB. These original certificates are approaching expiration, and devices containing affected certificate versions must update them to maintain Secure Boot functionality and avoid compromising security by losing security fixes related to Windows boot manager or Secure Boot.
The operating system’s certificate update protection mechanism relies on firmware components that might contain defects, which can cause certificate trust updates to fail or behave unpredictably. This leads to potential disruption of the Secure Boot trust chain and requires careful validation and deployment to restore intended security guarantees.
Certificate Authority (CA)
Location
Purpose
Expiration Date
Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011
KEK
Signs updates to the DB and DBX
06/24/2026
Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011
DB
Signs 3rd party boot loaders, Option ROMs, etc.
06/27/2026
Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011
DB
Signs the Windows Boot Manager
10/19/2026
For more information see this CVE and Windows Secure Boot certificate expiration and CA updates.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
Microsoft’s original 2011 Secure Boot certificates are expiring during 2026. Affected Windows devices need certificate trust updates to preserve Secure Boot protections. Firmware defects may cause those updates to fail or behave unpredictably, potentially weakening boot security or disrupting Secure Boot functionality.
Executive priority
Treat this as a time-bound platform-security maintenance program, not an immediate internet emergency. Prioritize inventory, firmware-diverse testing, and controlled deployment before the June and October 2026 expirations, especially for critical servers and difficult-to-recover devices.
Technical view
The affected certificates reside in UEFI KEK and DB stores and authorize trust-database updates, third-party boot components, and Windows Boot Manager. Microsoft rates the issue CVSS 6.4: exploitation requires local access, high privileges, and high complexity, but successful bypass could have high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact.
Likely exposure
Exposure includes the listed Windows 10, Windows 11, and Windows Server releases where Secure Boot relies on affected 2011 certificate versions. Actual exposure depends on each device’s UEFI certificate state and whether certificate updates complete successfully.
Exploitation context
The bundle marks this CVE as not listed in KEV and provides no evidence of active exploitation. The CVSS vector describes local, high-privilege, high-complexity exploitation without user interaction.
Researcher notes
CWE-1329 and the CVSS vector indicate a security-feature bypass with demanding prerequisites but potentially severe impact. The central research concern is unreliable trust-store transition caused by firmware behavior. The supplied evidence does not identify particular firmware vendors, device models, exploit techniques, or confirmed exploitation.
Mitigation direction
Inventory listed affected Windows client and server releases that use Secure Boot.
Follow Microsoft’s CVE and Secure Boot certificate update guidance for approved trust updates.
Test updates across representative firmware models before broad deployment.
Stage rollout carefully because firmware defects can disrupt certificate trust updates.
Complete certificate transitions before the relevant 2011 CA expiration dates.
Validation and detection
Verify intended certificate updates are present in the UEFI KEK and DB stores.
Confirm Secure Boot remains functional after updates on representative firmware models.
Check certificate update status and investigate failures or unpredictable behavior.
Validate Windows Boot Manager and authorized third-party boot components remain trusted.
Track successful completion across every affected client and server release.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
These mappings and lookup hints may be relevant to the vulnerability behavior, CWE, affected product, or exposure path. Glexia-inferred context is not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, CWE, or CVE Program mapping.
ATT&CK lookup starting points
Use these exact CWE pages and searches to review the Glexia ATT&CK library from this CVE's weakness and description context.
cwe · low confidence lookup
CWE-1329: Exact CWE lookup
Use the exact CWE identifier as the starting point before reviewing related ATT&CK behavior. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.
1CVSS vectors
3Timeline events
1ADP providers
2Source links
SSVC decision data
CISA-ADPCISA Coordinator
Timestamp
Version
2.0.3
Exploitation: noneAutomatable: noTechnical Impact: total
CVSS vector scores
1 official score
We collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.
CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.
CWE-1329 · source CWE mapping
Reliance on Component That is Not Updateable
Reliance on Component That is Not Updateable represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.