Camaleon CMS versions 2.4.5.0 through 2.9.0, prior to commit f54a77e, contain a path traversal vulnerability in the AWS S3 uploader implementation that allows authenticated users to read arbitrary files from the web server’s filesystem. The issue occurs in the download_private_file functionality when the application is configured to use the CamaleonCmsAwsUploader backend. Unlike the local uploader implementation, the AWS uploader does not validate file paths with valid_folder_path?, allowing directory traversal sequences to be supplied via the file parameter. As a result, any authenticated user, including low-privileged registered users, can access sensitive files such as /etc/passwd. This issue represents a bypass of the incomplete fix for CVE-2024-46987 and affects deployments using the AWS S3 storage backend.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
CVE-2026-1776 lets a logged-in Camaleon CMS user read files from the server when the site uses the AWS S3 uploader backend. This can expose secrets, configuration files, or operating-system data. It is not remote unauthenticated compromise, but low-privileged accounts may be enough.
Executive priority
Prioritize remediation for any Camaleon CMS site with user registration, customer logins, or shared staff accounts. Treat exposed secrets as plausible until logs and configuration are reviewed.
Technical view
Affected Camaleon CMS versions 2.4.5.0 through 2.9.0 before commit f54a77e lack path validation in AWS uploader download_private_file handling. Unlike the local uploader, it does not apply valid_folder_path?, allowing path traversal through the file parameter. The issue is CWE-22 and bypasses the incomplete CVE-2024-46987 fix.
Likely exposure
Exposure is limited to Camaleon CMS deployments using the CamaleonCmsAwsUploader AWS S3 storage backend, with attacker access to any authenticated account, including low-privileged registered users.
Exploitation context
The source bundle marks KEV as false, and no provided source states active exploitation. The issue is network reachable, low complexity, and authenticated, with high confidentiality impact but no stated integrity or availability impact.
Researcher notes
The key condition is the AWS uploader implementation, not all Camaleon CMS deployments. Validate backend configuration before scoping impact. Evidence supports arbitrary file read by authenticated users, but does not support unauthenticated exploitation or code execution.
Mitigation direction
Upgrade or patch to code containing commit f54a77e.
Check vendor guidance for an official fixed release or backport.
Identify whether CamaleonCmsAwsUploader is enabled on production sites.
Restrict low-privileged account access until patched where business allows.
Review server secrets that may be readable by the web process.
Validation and detection
Inventory Camaleon CMS versions across internet-facing and internal deployments.
Confirm whether AWS S3 uploader backend is configured.
Verify deployed code includes the f54a77e path validation fix.
Review application logs for unusual private file download requests.
Retest authorized file downloads after patching to confirm expected behavior.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
These mappings and lookup hints may be relevant to the vulnerability behavior, CWE, affected product, or exposure path. Glexia-inferred context is not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, CWE, or CVE Program mapping.
ATT&CK lookup starting points
Use these exact CWE pages and searches to review the Glexia ATT&CK library from this CVE's weakness and description context.
cwe · medium confidence lookup
CWE-22: File access and web shell behavior lookup
File traversal and upload weaknesses can lead teams to review file, web shell, execution, and collection telemetry. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
The CVE wording references file access or upload behavior, so file telemetry and web shell review may help. This is a Glexia inferred lookup path, not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, or CVE Program mapping.
These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.
We collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.