CVE-2026-1486: Org.keycloak.protocol.oidc.grants: disabled identity providers are still accepted for jwt authorization grant
A flaw was found in Keycloak. A vulnerability exists in the jwt-authorization-grant flow where the server fails to verify if an Identity Provider (IdP) is enabled before issuing tokens. The issuer lookup mechanism (lookupIdentityProviderFromIssuer) retrieves the IdP configuration but does not filter for isEnabled=false. If an administrator disables an IdP (e.g., due to a compromise or offboarding), an entity possessing that IdP's signing key can still generate valid JWT assertions that Keycloak accepts, resulting in the issuance of valid access tokens.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
Keycloak may still trust a disabled identity provider during a JWT authorization grant. If that provider was disabled because it was compromised or retired, someone with its signing key could still obtain valid access tokens. This is high urgency for organizations using Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.4 with external IdPs.
Executive priority
Prioritize remediation for Keycloak environments that rely on external IdPs for production access. The business risk is unauthorized token issuance after trust was intentionally revoked, which can undermine account offboarding and compromise response.
Technical view
The flaw is in Keycloak's jwt-authorization-grant flow. lookupIdentityProviderFromIssuer retrieves IdP configuration without excluding isEnabled=false, so JWT assertions from disabled IdPs can still be accepted and exchanged for access tokens. Red Hat rates this high with CVSS 3.1 score 8.8, requiring network access and low privileges.
Likely exposure
Exposure is likely where Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.4 affected packages are deployed and JWT authorization grant is used with brokered identity providers. Risk is highest where IdPs were disabled for compromise, offboarding, or trust revocation reasons.
Exploitation context
The source bundle does not show CISA KEV listing or active exploitation evidence. Exploitation depends on an entity possessing a disabled IdP's signing key and being able to submit JWT assertions accepted by Keycloak.
Researcher notes
Evidence is strongest for Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.4 package status and the described missing isEnabled check. The bundle does not provide exploit details, broad upstream version mapping, or proof of exploitation, so avoid assuming impact beyond listed products.
Mitigation direction
Apply Red Hat guidance in RHSA-2026:2365 and RHSA-2026:2366.
Upgrade only to vendor-listed fixed or unaffected Keycloak builds.
Inventory disabled IdPs and treat disablement alone as insufficient until patched.
Rotate or revoke IdP signing material when compromise or offboarding drove disablement.
Review Red Hat CVE guidance before applying compensating controls.
Validation and detection
Identify deployed Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.4 packages and exact versions.
Check whether rhbk/keycloak-rhel9, operator, or operator-bundle packages match affected entries.
Review realms using jwt authorization grant with brokered IdPs.
List disabled IdPs and confirm why each was disabled.
After patching, verify disabled IdPs no longer issue accepted token flows.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
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ATT&CK lookup starting points
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cwe · low confidence lookup
CWE-358: Exact CWE lookup
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These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.
2CVSS vectors
7Timeline events
2ADP providers
6Source links
SSVC decision data
CISA-ADPCISA Coordinator
Timestamp
Version
2.0.3
Exploitation: noneAutomatable: noTechnical Impact: total
CVSS vector scores
2 official scores
We collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.
CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.
CWE-358 · source CWE mapping
Improperly Implemented Security Check for Standard
Improperly Implemented Security Check for Standard represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.