CVE-2025-71127: wifi: mac80211: Discard Beacon frames to non-broadcast address
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: Discard Beacon frames to non-broadcast address
Beacon frames are required to be sent to the broadcast address, see IEEE
Std 802.11-2020, 11.1.3.1 ("The Address 1 field of the Beacon .. frame
shall be set to the broadcast address"). A unicast Beacon frame might be
used as a targeted attack to get one of the associated STAs to do
something (e.g., using CSA to move it to another channel). As such, it
is better have strict filtering for this on the received side and
discard all Beacon frames that are sent to an unexpected address.
This is even more important for cases where beacon protection is used.
The current implementation in mac80211 is correctly discarding unicast
Beacon frames if the Protected Frame bit in the Frame Control field is
set to 0. However, if that bit is set to 1, the logic used for checking
for configured BIGTK(s) does not actually work. If the driver does not
have logic for dropping unicast Beacon frames with Protected Frame bit
1, these frames would be accepted in mac80211 processing as valid Beacon
frames even though they are not protected. This would allow beacon
protection to be bypassed. While the logic for checking beacon
protection could be extended to cover this corner case, a more generic
check for discard all Beacon frames based on A1=unicast address covers
this without needing additional changes.
Address all these issues by dropping received Beacon frames if they are
sent to a non-broadcast address.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
A nearby attacker may send improperly addressed Wi-Fi beacon frames that Linux accepts as legitimate. This could redirect a connected device to another channel or disrupt wireless availability. The flaw can also bypass beacon protection under specific driver behavior. It does not require credentials or user interaction, but the attacker must be within radio range.
Executive priority
Treat this as a prompt patch-assessment item for Linux fleets that depend on Wi-Fi, especially mobile, operational, or availability-sensitive systems. It is high severity but proximity-limited, with no supplied evidence of active exploitation. Prioritize confirmed mac80211 exposure and vendor-supported updates rather than emergency organization-wide isolation.
Technical view
Linux mac80211 did not universally reject Beacon frames whose Address 1 field was non-broadcast. Protected-bit unicast Beacons could pass mac80211 validation when the driver lacked equivalent filtering, bypassing beacon protection. The stable-kernel fix discards received Beacon frames sent to any non-broadcast address. CVSS 3.1 is 7.1, reflecting adjacent access, low complexity, low integrity impact, and high availability impact.
Likely exposure
Exposure is most likely on Linux devices operating as Wi-Fi stations through mac80211, particularly with beacon protection enabled and drivers that do not independently discard unicast Beacons. Exploitation requires proximity within effective Wi-Fi radio range. The bundled version information contains unusual and ambiguous entries, so vendor-specific kernel backport status must determine actual exposure.
Exploitation context
The CVE is not listed as KEV, and the supplied sources provide no evidence of active exploitation or public weaponization. The described attack is proximity-based: an unauthenticated nearby transmitter could target an associated station with a crafted Beacon. Potential outcomes include unauthorized channel changes and wireless disruption rather than confidentiality loss.
Researcher notes
No CWE is assigned in the supplied record. The central condition is acceptance of non-broadcast Beacon frames, including a protected-bit corner case where BIGTK checking was ineffective. Stable commits demonstrate remediation, but the supplied affected-version representation is insufficient for reliable boundary analysis. Researchers should correlate distribution kernels and backports without assuming upstream version numbers directly represent exposure.
Mitigation direction
Apply the Linux distribution or device vendor update containing the applicable stable-kernel fix.
Use the cited stable commits to verify whether a vendor kernel includes the backport.
Prioritize Wi-Fi clients using mac80211, especially where beacon protection is enabled.
If updating is delayed, consult vendor guidance; the sources name no separate workaround.
Validation and detection
Inventory Linux systems with active Wi-Fi interfaces and record kernel, distribution, and firmware versions.
Confirm each vendor kernel includes the relevant stable commit or an equivalent backport.
Review vendor advisories because the bundled affected-version list contains ambiguous and unusual entries.
After updating, verify normal Wi-Fi association and channel-switch behavior in an authorized test environment.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
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CVE-2025-71127 mapping review
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