CVE-2025-68340: team: Move team device type change at the end of team_port_add
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
team: Move team device type change at the end of team_port_add
Attempting to add a port device that is already up will expectedly fail,
but not before modifying the team device header_ops.
In the case of the syzbot reproducer the gre0 device is
already in state UP when it attempts to add it as a
port device of team0, this fails but before that
header_ops->create of team0 is changed from eth_header to ipgre_header
in the call to team_dev_type_check_change.
Later when we end up in ipgre_header() struct ip_tunnel* points to nonsense
as the private data of the device still holds a struct team.
Example sequence of iproute2 commands to reproduce the hang/BUG():
ip link add dev team0 type team
ip link add dev gre0 type gre
ip link set dev gre0 up
ip link set dev gre0 master team0
ip link set dev team0 up
ping -I team0 1.1.1.1
Move team_dev_type_check_change down where all other checks have passed
as it changes the dev type with no way to restore it in case
one of the checks that follow it fail.
Also make sure to preserve the origial mtu assignment:
- If port_dev is not the same type as dev, dev takes mtu from port_dev
- If port_dev is the same type as dev, port_dev takes mtu from dev
This is done by adding a conditional before the call to dev_set_mtu
to prevent it from assigning port_dev->mtu = dev->mtu and instead
letting team_dev_type_check_change assign dev->mtu = port_dev->mtu.
The conditional is needed because the patch moves the call to
team_dev_type_check_change past dev_set_mtu.
Testing:
- team device driver in-tree selftests
- Add/remove various devices as slaves of team device
- syzbot
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
This Linux kernel flaw can leave a team network device in an inconsistent state after a failed port-add operation. A later packet operation may hit a kernel BUG or hang. The documented trigger uses local network configuration commands, so business risk is mainly availability on systems where such configuration is possible.
Executive priority
Treat as a scheduled kernel maintenance item unless affected systems delegate network administration to untrusted users or containers. Prioritize shared hosts, CI runners, and multi-tenant environments where kernel availability failures carry wider business impact.
Technical view
In the team driver, team_port_add changed the team device header_ops before all later checks completed. If adding an already-up GRE device failed, team0 could retain ipgre_header while its private data remained struct team, causing invalid interpretation later. The fix moves team_dev_type_check_change after checks and preserves MTU behavior.
Likely exposure
Likely exposed systems are Linux hosts running affected kernel versions with the team driver and local ability to create or manage team and GRE devices. Container or namespace environments granting network administration capabilities may be more relevant. The provided sources do not identify remote exposure.
Exploitation context
The source bundle shows a syzbot reproducer and an iproute2 command sequence causing hang or BUG. CISA KEV status is false, and no cited source states active exploitation in the wild.
Researcher notes
The evidence supports a kernel state-consistency bug in team_port_add, not a remotely exploitable network parsing issue. Impact is demonstrated as hang or BUG through local configuration. No CVSS, CWE, complete distro mapping, or exploit-in-the-wild evidence is provided.
Mitigation direction
Apply vendor kernel updates containing the referenced stable commits.
Check distribution advisories for exact fixed package versions.
Limit untrusted access to network administration capabilities.
Disable or avoid team and GRE device use where not operationally required.
Validation and detection
Inventory Linux kernel versions across servers and container hosts.
Check whether the relevant stable fix commit is present.
Review who can create team or GRE network devices.
Test remediation in staging with normal team driver workflows.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
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3Timeline events
0ADP providers
8Source links
Vulnerability timeline
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CVE reservedCVE Program
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CVE publishedCVE Program
The CVE record was published.
Dec 23, 2025, 13:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)
CVE updatedCVE Program
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